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INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL: RACE, MEMBERSHIP,
AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Sarah Krakoff*
Abstract: Courts address equal protection questions about the distinct legal treatment of
American Indian tribes in the following dichotomous way: are classifications concerning
American Indians "racial or political?" If the classification is political (i.e., based on
federally recognized tribal status or membership in a federally recognized tribe) then courts
will not subject it to heightened scrutiny. If the classification is racial rather than political,
then courts may apply heightened scrutiny. This Article challenges the dichotomy itself. The
legal categories "tribe" and "tribal member" are themselves political, and reflect the ways in
which tribes and tribal members have been racialized by U.S. laws and policies.
First, the Article traces the evolution of tribes from pre-contact independent sovereigns to
their current status as "federally recognized tribes." This history reveals that the federal
government's objective of minimizing the tribal land base entailed a racial logic that was
reflected in decisions about when and how to recognize tribal status. The logic was that of
elimination: Indian people had to disappear in order to free territory for non-Indian
settlement. The Article then examines two very distinct tribal places, the Colorado River
Indian Tribes' (CRIT) reservation and the former Dakota (Sioux) Nation of the Great Plains.
The United States' policies had different effects on the CRIT (where four distinct ethnic and
linguistic groups were consolidated into one tribe) and tlie Sioux (where related ethnic and
linguistic groups were scattered apart), but the causal structures were the same. Indian people
stood in the way of non-Indian possession of land and resources, and federal policies defined
tribes and their land base with the goal of shrinking both. Despite these goals, the CRIT and
Sioux Tribes have exercised their powers of self-governance and created homelands that
foster cultural survival for their people. Like other federally recognized tribes, they have used
the given legal structure to perpetuate their own forms of indigenous governance,
notwithstanding the law's darker origins.
The legal histories of CRIT and the Sioux Tribes reveal that unraveling the logic of
racism in American Indian law has less to do with tinkering with current equal protection
doctrine than it does with recognizing the workings of power, politics, and law in the context
of the United States' unique brand of settler colonialism. The way to counter much of the
prior racial discrimination against American Indians is to support laws that perpetuate the
sovereign political status of tribes, rather than to dismantle tribes by subjecting them to
judicial scrutiny in a futile attempt to disentangle the racial from the political.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts address equal protection questions about the distinct legal
treatment of American Indian tribes in the following dichotomous way:
are classifications concerning American Indians "racial or political?" If
the classification is political (i.e., based on federally recognized tribal
status or membership in a federally recognized tribe), then courts will
not subject the classification to heightened scrutiny. If the classification
is racial rather than political, then courts may apply heightened scrutiny.
This Article challenges the dichotomy itself.
The legal categories "tribe" and "tribal member" reflect the ways that
tribes and tribal members have been racialized by U.S. laws and policies.
The racialization of American Indians, which served the purposes of
justifying expropriation of their lands and imposing policies of forced
assimilation, is today embedded in their separate political status. The
political and the racial are therefore hopelessly intermingled in current
legal definitions of tribes in ways that nonetheless point to the same
deferential conclusion that courts currently reach. In general, courts
uphold laws and policies that further the separate, and constitutionally
based, political status of American Indian tribes. The upshot of this
Article is that this is the best that courts can do, and to the extent they
are tempted to untangle the racial from the political with respect to the
status of American Indian tribes, they tread well beyond their
competence and risk perpetuating the very policies that have
discriminated against American Indians, and that, in general, the
political branches have abandoned. To illustrate and excavate the "racial
and political" conclusion, the Article visits two very distinct tribal
places, the Colorado River Indian Tribes' (CRIT) reservation and the
former Dakota (Sioux) Nation of the Great Plains.
The CRIT reservation straddles the Colorado River several hours west
of Phoenix, Arizona. The CRIT is a single federally recognized
American Indian tribe whose members include people of Mojave,
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Chemehuevi, Navajo, and Hopi descent. Today the CRIT is a successful
Indian nation, with established water rights, a model riparian restoration
project, and a well-functioning tribal government.' But at the time of its
founding in 1865, the multi-ethnic composition of the CRIT and the idea
that it could one day constitute a coherent polity was an afterthought at
best. The federal government's intent in establishing the CRIT
reservation was to clear the surrounding area for white settlement.2 The
government's objective was a political one-to gather the many tribes
that called the Colorado River basin home and concentrate them in a
single place. Doing so, federal officials hoped, would quiet non-Indian
concerns about coming to the region. With the Indian threat removed,
the southwest desert, and in particular the areas proximate to the only
major water source, could be open for white business.
In the Plains, the many bands and groups that once comprised the
Great Dakota (Sioux) Nation' are today concentrated into ten federally
recognized tribes in North and South Dakota.5 Unlike the CRIT, who
1. See About the Mohave, Chemehuevi, Hopi and Navajo Tribes, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES,
http://www.crit-nsn.gov/crit-contents/about/ (last visited June 30, 2012).
2. See UNIV. OF ARIz. BUREAU OF ETHNIC RESEARCH, DEP'T OF ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC STUDIES, COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION; REPORT No. Two: HISTORY OF THE

COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION 7 (1958)
RESERVATION].

[hereinafter HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER

3. See infra Part II.A.
4. Europeans derived the name "Sioux" from the Ojibwa name for the tribes to their west, natowe-ssiwa, which has been variously translated to mean: "people of an alien tribe," GUY GIBBON,
THE Sioux: THE DAKOTA AND LAKOTA NATIONS 2 (2003); "rattlesnake," HERBERT T. HOOVER,
THE YANKTON SIOUX 13 (Frank W. Porter III ed., 1988); "a diminutive of snakes, adders, and, by
extension, enemies," ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUx: UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY ON TRIAL 5 (rev. ed. 1993); and "the Lesser Adders," ROYAL B. HASSRICK, THE SIOUX:
LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF A WARRIOR SOCIETY 6 (1964). Some scholars have criticized these
translations as misconstruing the "actual historical etymology of the name," asserting instead that
na-towe-ssiwa was used by Ojibwa in reference to the Sioux as a purely "ethnic designation" to
mean "speaker of a foreign language" or "member of an alien tribe," and only later developed a
secondary meaning connoting snakes. See Douglas R. Parks & Raymond J. DeMallie, Sioux,
Assiniboine, and Stoney Dialects: A Classgfication, 34 ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS 233, 234
(1992). Many Sioux people (and most anthropologists) prefer to use the term Dakota, see Stephen
A. Feraca & James H. Howard, The Identity and Demography of the Dakota or Sioux Tribe, 8
PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST 80, 81 (1963), or the native word OCeti Sakawin, see JESSICA DAWN
PALMER, THE DAKOTA PEOPLES: A HISTORY OF THE DAKOTA, LAKOTA AND NAKOTA THROUGH
1863, at 41 (2008). This Article uses both Sioux and Dakota because most tribes still use Sioux in
their official, federally recognized tribal names.
5. There are Sioux Tribes and First Nations (Canada) outside of the Dakotas as well. In Canada,
there are nine reserves in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and in the United States there are tribes in
Montana (Ft. Peck), Minnesota (Upper Sioux, Lower Sioux, Prior Lake, and Prairie Island), and
Nebraska (Santee). See MICHAEL JOHNSON, TRIBES OF THE Sioux NATION 9 (2001). The history,
infra Part IIB, refers to the Sioux's larger geographical presence, but information about current
tribal enrollment and demographics was collected only for the ten tribes in North and South Dakota.
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were forced together despite their distinct linguistic and ethnic
backgrounds, the Dakota share a common linguistic and ethnic heritage
and were, in some instances, scattered apart and in others mixed
together. Today, an individual Sioux Indian is likely to simultaneously
identify with the greater Dakota Nation; with one of the three
subdivisions of the nation (Santee, Yankton, or Teton); with one of the
language dialects associated with each subdivision (Dakota, Lakota, or
Nakota); with one of the seven "Council Fires" (bands) under those
subdivisions; with the geography and culture of her band; and, finally,
with her tribe.6 This self-identification occurs regardless of the federally
recognized tribe in which the Dakota/Sioux Indian happens to be
enrolled.
The United States' laws and policies with respect to establishing
reservations and designating which Indian peoples would reside on them
had different effects on the CRIT (consolidating) and the Sioux
(scattering and concentrating), but the causal structures were the same.
Indian people stood in the way of non-Indian settlement, and U.S.
policies constructed tribes themselves, as well as their rights to land,
consistent with the political objectives of minimizing tribal presence and
claims. The laws with respect to the treatment of Native peoples in these
two regions, and throughout the country, followed what Patrick Wolfe
has termed "the logic of elimination." Understanding this logic, and the
legal forms it generated, is necessary for a clear assessment of
contemporary legal doctrines affecting American Indians, in particular
equal protection analysis as applied to tribes and Indian people. An
important body of scholarship on racism and American Indian law
makes the point that the racialization of American Indians has taken
different forms, and sometimes requires different remedies, than the
6. See PALMER, supra note 4, at 41; see generally JAMES SATTERLEE & VERNON D. MALAN,
U.S.D.A. REPORT #SD-PAM-126: HISTORY AND ACCULTURATION OF DAKOTA INDIANS (1972)
(recounting history of the Dakota groups from historical times to the present and including
discussion of the three subdivisions, language groupings, and bands).
7. This Article focuses on the CRIT and the Sioux Tribes of the Dakotas, but similar policies of
concentrating and consolidating are evident in many tribal histories. See, e.g., Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Politics, History and Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L.
REV. 487, 502-03 (2006) (describing attempts to bind all of the Ottawa and Chippewa Bands with a
single treaty). Professor Fletcher concludes, "The purpose for combining the various disparate and
discrete bands was to allow the American negotiators to bind all the Ottawa and Chippewa bands at
one time-and to manipulate the negotiations in a divide and conquer strategy." Id. at 503.
8. Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387,
387 (2006) (citing Patrick Wolfe, Nation and miscegeNation: Discursive Continuity in the PostMabo Era, Soc. ANALYSIS, Oct. 1994, at 93-152; PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY (1999) (hereinafter WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM]).

1046

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1041

racialization of African-Americans, Latinos, and other subordinated
groups. 9 This Article furthers the project by examining how federal
Indian policies constructed the federally recognized tribe consistent with
the government's eliminationist agenda (including its racial logic) and
thereby entangled the racial and the political within tribal communities
in ways that defy ahistorical formulations, like color-blindness, as a
means of redress.10
The eliminationist construction of the Indian "race" has crucial, yet
poorly understood, implications for equal protection doctrine in
particular. In Morton v. Mancari,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
federal classifications singling out American Indians for "particular and
special" treatment should be upheld so long as "the special treatment can
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians .... " 2 The Court's adoption of a modified form of
rational basis review rests, at least in part, on the justification that tribal
membership is a political category rather than an ethnic or racial one. 1 3
While this ruling has so far stood the test of time, questions have arisen
about Mancari's underpinnings and its future. 14 The Court has indicated
that the incorporation of blood quantum and lineage into tribal
membership criteria makes the "political versus racial distinction" less
than convincing,15 and scholars have suggested that the dichotomy
9. See VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 171 (Univ.

Okla. Press 1988) (1969); Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L.
REv. 591 (2009); Addie Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial
Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 958 (2011); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED
WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN

AMERICA (2005) (arguing that all of American Indian law, even its doctrine of tribal sovereignty, is
tainted with its racist origins). Other scholars have made similar arguments in the context of
explaining why American Indian law and race law should continue to be viewed and analyzed
distinctly. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understandingofthe Political Status ofIndian
Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 153, 155 (2008) (acknowledging racist origins of much of American
Indian policy, but arguing that "virtually all elements of Indian affairs can be traced to the decision
of the United States to recognize Indian tribes as political entities").
10. For a recent example of the Supreme Court's embrace of a color-blind approach to remedying
discrimination, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) ("The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
11. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
12. Id. at 555.
13. See id. at 553 n.24.
14. A federal district court recently openly criticized Mancari's approach and outlined how it
would have approached classifications based on tribal status had it been freed from precedent to do
so. See KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass.), aff'd in part, vacated
and remanded in part,693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
15. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519-20 (2000) (noting that the Mancari Court found it
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unnecessarily entrenches a racially exceptionalist understanding of
American Indians.16 In terms of Mancari's future, the Court has hinted
that legislation treating tribal members as a class in ways that are distinct
from non-tribal members could raise at least colorable equal protection
concerns, even when the congressional action furthers tribal self-

government. 17
If the federal courts reassess Mancari, they are unlikely to do so
consistent with an anti-subordination agenda.' 8 To the contrary, the
Court's increasingly strong embrace of a colorblind jurisprudence,
which views all current racial categorization in the same light
irrespective of ongoing and historically distinct structural effects of
racial subordination,' is likelier to lead to heightened judicial scrutiny of
many forms of distinctive treatment of American Indian tribes. Courts
might then second-guess even laws and policies rooted in the longstanding, constitutionally based commitment to tribes' separate political
existence. 2 0 Striking down classifications that support tribal self"important" that a preference was "not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians,"' but
rather, "only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes") (quoting Mancari,417 U.S. at 553 n.24);
cf Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (questioning the continuing vitality of
Mancari).
16. See Rolnick, supra note 9. Professor Rolnick's argument is a nuanced one. She does not urge
courts to abandon the Mancari rule. Rather, she contends that Mancari stands for a rift between
civil rights approaches to equality and Indian law approaches to equality, and urges a contextualized
and historicized understanding of the ways that Indians have been racialized. Rolnick's aims are
compatible with those of this Article, though to some extent the diagnoses and prescriptions
diverge. Other scholars simply conflate classifications designed to redress the unique forms of
discrimination against American Indians with other kinds of racial classifications and criticize them
on that basis. See, e.g., RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE 86 (2005); RANDALL KENNEDY,

INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES 499 (2003) (both criticizing the Indian Child Welfare Act based on
misplaced race-matching concerns).
17. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 208-10 (2004) (refusing to consider improperly
raised equal protection challenge, but inviting future litigants to raise the issue).
18. Scholars have urged such a reinterpretation. See Rolnick, supra note 9, at 967, 1036; Rose
Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus PoliticalIdentity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 801 (2008). In general, an anti-subordinationist approach toward racial and ethnic
classifications interrogates whether the classifications perpetuate historical structural forms of
subordination that hinder substantive equality today, whereas a color-blind formalist approach
simply asks whether the classifications check people off by race, irrespective of the law's purpose to
correct or remedy racial inequality.
19. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1991) (reviewing and critiquing earlier development of the color-blind paradigm in equal protection
analysis); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero Sum
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197 (2010) (canvassing recent cases
embracing a color-blind approach to discrimination cases).
20. For a compelling argument in support of the constitutional legitimacy of the political
relationship doctrine, see Fletcher, supra note 9, at 165-71.

1048

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1041

determination would be very harmful to tribes and their members. There
are, therefore, practical reasons to support the current doctrinal
formulation, despite its conceptual flaws.
In addition to the pragmatic benefits of the Mancari doctrine,
Mancariwas right, even if for reasons not appreciated by the Court. The
legal categories "federally recognized tribe" and "tribal member" are
inextricably political. The federal government's policies with respect to
creating Indian reservations and establishing federally recognized tribes
included the following actions: forcing distinct linguistic, ethnic, and
political groupings of indigenous peoples onto the same reservation;
dispersing cohesive groups apart on separate reservations; and requiring
that these politically-assembled groups become a single political entity
in order to retain their pre-constitutional, pre-contact sovereignty. Some
or all of these practices are evident in the legal histories of the two tribal
groups examined here. The histories of the CRIT and the ten federally
recognized tribes of the Great Sioux Nation that are now located in the
Dakotas reveal the disjunction between pre-contact ethnic, linguistic,
cultural, and territorial affiliation on the one hand and legal status as a
federally recognized tribe on the other.
The legal categories of tribe and tribal member are therefore political
in both a negative and positive sense. They are products of the politics of
subordinating indigenous peoples and accessing their land and
resources. 2 1 Yet they derive from tribes' pre-contact inherent
sovereignty, a political status that has been recognized since the
founding of the United States.2 Throughout history, and particularly in
recent times, tribes have used their political status as sovereigns to
protect their land, livelihood, and culture. Tribal membership gives
important legal and political protection for ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
affiliation, even if those categories do not track perfectly along the lines
of the particular federally recognized tribe.24 But even if American
Indian tribes and tribal members, as agents of their own political and
legal fate, have made the best possible use of a legal construct, the

21. See infra Part Ill.
22. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 164-72 (documenting the original understanding, embraced by
the framers in the Constitution, of the federal government's political relationship with Indian tribes).
23. See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1195 (2004) (concluding that tribes are enacting
sovereignty on the ground in ways that foster and protect unique group identity that stems from
place-based wisdom and culture). "The Navajo Nation experience indicates that domesticating
federal Indian law, warts and all, can be part of the process of enacting tribal sovereignty." Id.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 337-47 (discussing CRIT today).
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darker aspects of its origins remain.25
This Article unearths the inherently political construction of the legal
categories "federally recognized tribe" and "tribal member" in the
following way. Part I provides legal background in equal protection
doctrine and in the history of federal recognition of tribal status,
including how federal recognition became a prerequisite for tribes'
retention of their political and legal sovereignty. Part II examines the
legal history of federal recognition and membership composition of the
CRIT and the Sioux tribes of the Dakotas.
Part III locates these histories in theories about racial formation and
colonialism in the American Indian context. Specifically, it examines the
social construction of the American Indian "race" according to the
26
approach developed by Michael Omi and Howard Winant. Omi and
Winant's racial formation theory "emphasizes the social nature of race,
the absence of any essential racial characteristics, the historical
flexibility of racial meanings and categories, the conflictual character of
race at both the 'micro-' and 'macro-social' levels, and the irreducible
political aspect of racial dynamics." 2 7 Patrick Wolfe, applying a similar
theoretical approach to the context of indigenous peoples, has
documented the ways that racial regimes are deployed to achieve
distinctive ends in settler-colonialist societies, like the United States and
Australia.28 The object of settler colonialism is to separate indigenous
25. Understanding those origins sheds necessary light on structures that, to this day, constrain
American Indian law and civil rights law from achieving their promise of self-determination and
anti-subordination. Some scholars argue this point more strenuously than others. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 9 (arguing that federal Indian law will never result in true self-determination for tribes
unless the foundational cases, which rely on racialized understandings of tribes, are reversed);
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYo. L. REV. 295, 303
(2011) ("In sum, federal Indian law is both about race and not about race."); see also Robert B.
Porter, A Proposalto the Hanodaganyasto Decolonize American Indian ControlLaw, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 899 (1998) (arguing that core aspects of federal Indian law are infected with the
subordinating process of colonization and therefore require thorough revision).
26. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1994); see also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev.

ed. 2006) (analyzing the role of law in the formation of racial hierarchies in the United States);
Laura E. G6mez, Race Mattered: Racial Formation and the Politics of Crime in TerritorialNew
Mexico, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1395 (2002) (extending racial formation theory to territorial New
Mexico).
27. OMI & WINANT, supranote 26, at 4.
28. See Patrick Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race, 106 AM.
HIST. REV. 866, 867 (2001) [hereinafter Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference] ("[R]ace is but one
among various regimes of difference that have served to distinguish dominant groups from groups
whom they initially encountered in colonial contexts . . .. American Indians and Aboriginal people
in Australia share much more than the quality of attracting assimilation policies. Above all, they are
both sets of peoples whose territorial expropriation was foundational to the colonial formations into
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peoples from their land, rather than to extract labor from them. 29 The
racial formation of American Indians was therefore very different from
that of African-American slaves.3 0 With respect to the former, the racial
logic followed the path of elimination: the fewer indigenous peoples
standing between settler colonists and claims to land, the better.3 1 With
respect to the latter, the racial logic was that of proliferation: "one drop"
of African blood resulted in blackness, because the more slaves (or,
post-slavery, legally disenfranchised blacks), the larger the labor force. 32
As Part III discusses, the legal histories of the CRIT and the Great Sioux
Nation support the settler colonialist theory in various uncanny ways, in
that tribes were constructed and racialized consistent with the agenda of
clearing the territory for non-Indians.
Part IV applies the insights from the previous sections to
contemporary equal protection issues. Federal policies defining tribal
status and limiting tribal territory furthered the political goals of fixing
tribes in time and space in order to effectuate non-Indian settlement.
Each "federally recognized tribe" still reflects that eliminationist policy,
even though each tribe also has legitimate pre-contact claims to an
inherent sovereignty that was never relinquished. Recently, some federal

which Europeans incorporated them."). Settler-colonialism, the term for the type of colonization
that occurred in North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand, is characterized primarily
by a population of settlers who came to stay and who, in relatively short order, outnumbered the
aboriginal inhabitants of the land. See generally PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra
note 8; see also AZIZ RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 12-13 (2010) (defining
settler empire and describing key features and consequences of that status).
29. See Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 868 ("As opposed to franchisecolonial relationships (such as the British Raj, the Netherlands East Indies), settler colonialism seeks
to replace the natives on their land rather than extract surplus value by mixing their labor with a
colony's natural resources.").
30. See id. at 866-67, 881.
31. See id. at 867-68.
32. See WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 2. As Wolfe explains, settler
colonialism establishes a logic of race for indigenous peoples that differs from that of other colonial
societies, and also differs from the logic applied to African slaves. This is because settler colonialist
societies, including the United States and Australia, were faced with the problem of a minority
aboriginal population from whom the settlers desired, foremost, to extract land. By contrast, African
slaves were racialized in ways that comported with the primary goal of extracting labor:
The relationship between Native and African Americans illustrates the distinction particularly
well. In the main, Native (North) Americans were cleared from their land rather than exploited
for their labour, their place being taken by displaced Africans who provided the labour to be
mixed with the expropriated land.... The ramifications of this distinction flow through,
particularly in so far as they affect the different constructions of 'miscegenation' that have
been applied to the two communities. Briefly, whilst the one-drop rule has meant that the
category 'black' can withstand unlimited admixture, the category 'red' has been highly
vulnerable to dilution.
Id. at 1-2.
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courts have indicated that they would rethink Mancari's rational basis
approach if they were not constrained by precedent.33 For example, a
federal district court in Massachusetts recently upheld a state gaming
law against an equal protection challenge, but only because Mancari
required that outcome.34 If the court could have started from scratch, it
would have adopted a tiered approach, subjecting classifications
"relating to native land, tribal status or Indian culture" to "minimal
review," but subjecting "[laws granting gratuitous Indian preferences
divorced from those interests, [such as] a law granting tribes a quasimonopoly on casino gaming ... to more searching scrutiny."
Judicial attempts to untangle the racial from the political by deferring
to policies that the courts think are consistent with traditional Indian
affairs (land, status, culture), but scrutinizing those that the courts deem
"gratuitous preferences," such as regulations of economic activity that
treat tribes as sovereign governments (as the gaming laws do), are more
likely to perpetuate the racialized agenda of eliminating tribes than to
reverse it. Tools already exist for federal courts interested in scrutinizing
federal laws and classifications that harm tribes and tribal members by
exceeding the bounds of the trust relationship. Dismantling Mancari's
rational basis approach to classifications that recognize tribal selfgovernance and allow tribes to move beyond stereotypical assumptions
about Indian status and culture would put the federal courts, to
paraphrase Professor Phil Frickey, in the role of modern-day colonizer. 3 7
The legal histories of the CRIT and the Sioux Tribes, analyzed in the
context of race, sovereignty, and tribal membership, reveal that
unraveling the logic of racism in American Indian law has much less to
do with tinkering with the Mancarirule than it does with facing squarely
the workings of power, politics, and law in the context of the United
States' unique brand of settler colonialism. The way to counter the logic
of elimination is to support laws and policies that perpetuate the separate
33. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005); KG Urban Enters., LLC v.
Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass.), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 693 F.3d I
(1st Cir. 2012), discussed infra Part IV.A.
34. See KG Urban Enters., 839 F. Supp. 2d 388.
35. Id. at 404.
36. See Bethany Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and FederalIndian Law, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1165, 1187 (2010) (making a similar argument about Mancari, and describing the failure of
subsequent cases to "explain [Mancari's]rationale or build on its potential."); Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 279
(1984) (arguing that there is room, under the existing Mancari formulation, for courts to scrutinize
legislation that harms tribal rights).
37. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1999).

1052

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1041

sovereign political status of tribes as peoples, rather than to dismantle
tribes by subjecting them to judicial scrutiny in a futile attempt to
disentangle the racial from the political.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND OF EQUAL PROTECTION, TRIBAL
RECOGNITION, AND TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP

According to a number of indicia, the United States is well on its way
to becoming a "post-racial" society. Yet the considerable legal and
political machinery devoted, since the Civil Rights era, to stamping out
racial discrimination has nonetheless failed to eliminate the structures
that legalized forms of racism set in motion. 39 The structures themselves
are complicated, taking root in law, culture, and politics in ways that
require deep and sustained attention to arrive at approaches that may
finally deliver on the promise of equality. 40 Furthermore, the very
definition of equality may vary depending on the origins and forms of
prior subordination. 4 1 For Native people in the U.S., equality
encompasses the right to continue as members of their own sovereign
Indian nations, as well as the right to be free from racial discrimination
perpetrated by state or federal actors.42
38. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau announced recently that, for the first time, there were
more minority children under the age of one than there were white children. See Most Children
Younger Than Age 1 are Minorities, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 17,
California,
2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cbl2-90.html.
Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas have majority-minority populations. See Census Bureau Releases
State and County Data Depicting Nation's Population Ahead of 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (May 14, 2009), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb0976.html.
39. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLOR BLINDNESS (2010); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, NOT EVEN PAST: BARACK OBAMA AND THE
BURDEN OF RACE (2010); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
449,450 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
40. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 39; SUGRUE, supra note 39; see also WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR INTHE INNER CITY (2009) (attributing
the persistence of poverty for urban African-Americans to the legacies of legalized racism, raceneutral changes in the economy that disproportionately affected black urban areas, as well as to
cultural factors that were inevitable adaptations to legal and de facto isolation).
41. See Berger, supra note 9; Fletcher, supra note 25; Carole Goldberg, American Indians and
"Preferential" Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002); Juan Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race: Exploring the "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 1213 (1997); Rolnick, supranote 9.
42. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.03[2][a], at 918-19 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005 ) [hereinafter COHEN] ("Federal constitutional protections for individual
rights against state or federal action do not differentiate Indians from other claimants.. . .Yet
Indians, especially when they are invoking tribal interests, continue to fit uneasily into the
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From a certain (perhaps naive) vantage point, one might expect that
the complicated and varied manifestations of inequality would have
resulted in more nuanced forms of legal redress. The federal courts,
however, have followed a steady course away from recognizing broad
structural forms of discrimination and their varied effects. Instead, the
courts have adopted a model of individualized harm, which requires
showings of individual racist intent.4 ' This is true even in the context of
remedies for historical patterns of intentional discrimination. The
trajectory of equal protection analysis in school desegregation cases is
illustrative. In the years following Brown v. Board of Education,44
federal courts enforced a wide variety of remedies aimed at
desegregating school districts where intentional racial discrimination had
been found. Gradually, remedies that reached beyond the school districts
themselves, or that aimed prophylactically to achieve racial integration,
were rejected by the courts. 4 5 As the federal judiciary's heroic civil
rights era receded into the past, the notion that courts should resolve
societal harms caused by structures of racial discrimination receded with
it.46

In parallel with the courts' withdrawal from implementing broad
remedies to racial discrimination, the judiciary imposed increasingly
exacting

scrutiny

on

voluntary

programs

aimed

at

increasing

representation of racial minorities. White plaintiffs successfully
challenged affirmative action programs in the contexts of employment,
education, and other state or federal benefits.4 7 While to date the
constitutional framework for protection of individual rights.").
43. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES 710 (3d ed.

2006); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,88 VA. L. REv. 951, 1009 (2002); Norton,
supra note 19; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
ConstitutionalStruggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470, 1473 (2004) ("[E]qual protection
law has expressed anticlassification, rather than antisubordination, commitments as it has developed
over the past half-century.").
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking
down a school district's use of race as a tiebreaker in magnet school applications in order to achieve
racial balance); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (rejecting inter-district bussing as a
remedy for segregation within an inner-city school district, even when "white flight" was a
consequence of the intra-city desegregation remedy).
46. See Norton, supra note 19.
47. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding policy of racial preference in
admissions at state law school); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down policy of
racial preference for undergraduate admissions at state university); City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down affirmative action program in city contracting); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school board's policy of extending
preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of their race); Regents of Univ. of
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Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that achieving racial
and ethnic diversity can be a constitutional objective in certain narrow
contexts, the circumstances that justify race-conscious programs have
little to do with the history of the legally sanctioned racial caste system
that constructed our past. 4 8 In today's doctrinal landscape, discrimination
on the basis of race is not a claim made against the backdrop of history
but in the context of an individual encounter, independent of time and
space. Yet it is impossible to understand American Indian law without
knowing its history. 49 The entirety of the constitutionally based
government-to-government relationship between Indian nations and the
United States rests on that history. 50 Equal protection challenges to laws
and programs that benefit American Indian tribes and tribal members lie
at this crossroads of ahistorical doctrine and historically-dependent
context.
A.

The MancariEqual Protection Framework

In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) employment preference against a challenge brought by
non-Indian plaintiffs." The Court held that federal classifications that
benefit American Indians should be upheld so long as they can be tied to
Congress's "unique obligations toward the Indians."5 2 To put this in the
context of equal protection doctrine generally, the Supreme Court has
settled on a three-tier system for the judicial review of equal protection
challenges to federal or state actions that burden or benefit particular
groups." First, the Court subjects most classifications to rational basis
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down quantitative means to achieve racial diversity in
state medical school).
48. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 323-33 (reaffirming Bakke's rejection of remedying past or societal
discrimination as compelling interest but affirming limited use of race as a factor to enhance
educational environment).
49. See COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.01, at 6-7 (describing the centrality of history to American
Indian law); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 1
(1983) ("It is impossible to understand American Indians in their contemporary setting without first
gaining some knowledge of their history as it has been formed and shaped by the Indian experience
with Western civilization."); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 4-

5 (1987) (describing commitment to historical promises and relationships as the key recurring theme
in modem Indian law).
50. See COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.01, at 8 ("The centuries-old relationship between the United
States and Indian nations is founded upon historic government-to-government dealings and a longheld recognition of Indians' special legal status.").
51. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
52. Id. at 555.
53. Equal protection challenges to federal action are brought under the Due Process Clause of the

2012]

INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL

1055

review, meaning that if the legal distinction is based on any facially
plausible rationale, the Court will not second-guess the legislative
decision. 54 Second, a middle-tier of review (known as "intermediate
scrutiny"), applied most commonly to classifications based on sex, asks
whether the distinction is reasonably related to an important
governmental objective.5 5 And third, classifications based on race or
ethnicity are subject to the Court's most exacting review ("strict
scrutiny"), which asks whether there is a compelling state interest that
supports the classification and whether the government's means of
achieving that interest are narrowly tailored to the government's
objective. 6 Overtly discriminatory classifications-those that deprive
racial or ethnic groups of access to programs or benefits because of their
racial or ethnic status-nearly automatically fail strict scrutiny.s7 The
harder cases, alluded to above, involve either actions that do not overtly
sort people based on race or ethnicity, but that nonetheless result in
disparate effects on minority racial or ethnic groups, or actions that sort
people by race or ethnicity with the benign purpose of either remedying
past discrimination or promoting diversity.5 Challenges to affirmative
Fifth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
applies only to states, but the "Court repeatedly has held that the Fifth Amendment imposes on the
Federal Government the same standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981) (citing
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971)).
54. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding state law requiring police
officers to retire at age fifty); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (upholding
school funding system that discriminated against poor districts); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
43, at 669-74 (summarizing tiers of judicial review). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(applying strengthened version of rational basis review to equal protection challenge involving
distinctions based on sexual orientation).
55. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), for the latest articulation of the gender
standard of intermediate scrutiny. On very rare occasions, the Supreme Court has applied
heightened review based on an ad-hoc mix of factors. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(factors warranting heightened scrutiny included childhood, education, and minority status).
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (strict scrutiny must be used in
evaluating the routine racial segregation of new intake prisoners); Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school board's policy of extending
preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of their race); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 43, at 694-95.
57. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state court acted unconstitutionally by taking into
account a stepfather's race in child custody case); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state
miscegenation statute unconstitutional); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down
statute requiring the race of candidates for office to be listed on ballots); CHEMERINSKY, supra note
43, at 671 ("Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged law.").
58. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); McKlesky v. Kemp, 481
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action programs in education and employment fall into the latter
category.
In Mancari, the Court adopted a form of the first type of reviewrational basis review-for federal classifications singling out members
of American Indian tribes for distinctive treatment. According to
Mancari, if the classification is based on tribal members' political
affiliation with a recognized American Indian tribe60 and furthers
Congress's "unique obligation" to American Indians, then the Court will
not subject it to a heightened form of judicial review.61 For a host of
practical and legal reasons, the Mancari rule makes sense. As the
Mancari Court noted, the federal government has been treating
American Indian tribes and their members distinctively since the
country's founding.62 License for distinctive treatment exists in the
Constitution, in the history of federal-tribal legal relations,64 and in
international law norms that formed the basis for domestic federal Indian
law. 65 Further, if the Court had held otherwise, federal courts could be
subjecting scores of treaties, statutes, and policies to heightened judicial
scrutiny.66 Professor Carole Goldberg has argued that the federal courts'
institutional limitations and biases make it at least plausible that much of
federal Indian law would fail to survive this more exacting form of
review. As she put it, "it seems unmanageable and unpredictable to
rely on strict scrutiny survival as the basis for a response to the current

U.S. 279 (1987) (proof of racially disproportionate impact in administration of death penalty did not
constitute equal protection violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding police
department's use of a test that disproportionately disadvantaged African-American applicants).
59. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S.
469.
60. 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 ("The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of
'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes.").
61. Id. at 555.
62. See id. at 551-53; see also Fletcher,supra note 9, at 164-72.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes").
64. See William W. Quinn, FederalAcknowledgment ofAmerican Indian Tribes: The Historical
Development ofa Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 338-47 (1990).
65. See ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE

DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 218 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating FederalIndian Law, 81
MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)
(relying on the discovery doctrine, including its origins in international law, as basis for U.S.
relations with tribes).
66. See Mancari,417 U.S. at 552.
67. See Goldberg, supranote 41, at 955-57.
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challenges to federal Indian law."68
Of course, Mancari's practicality cannot constitute its sole defense.
Scholars and courts have struggled with Mancari's political-versusracial distinction for reasons that are, on the surface, understandable. For
example, what does it mean for a classification to be based on tribal
membership, as opposed to race or ethnicity? Mancari involved a
challenge by four non-Indian BIA employees to a Bureau policy
implementing a long-standing statutory preference for Indian
employment in the agency.69 The preference, included in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),70 was a small part of a larger
legislative program aimed at restoring self-governance to tribes.7' The
connection in the IRA between membership in a political entity (an
Indian tribe) and the employment preference was all but self-evident,
given the overriding statutory scheme. 72 Nonetheless, the IRA's goal of
improving tribal participation in the federal agency that oversees tribal
affairs was largely neglected in the following decades. When the BIA,
prompted by a lawsuit brought by tribal members in the 1970s,n
implemented a policy to enforce the IRA's mandate, it supplied the
following definition of Indian: "To be eligible for preference in
appointment, promotion, and training, an individual must be one-fourth
or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized
tribe." 7 4 The MancariCourt described this categorization as political, not
racial:
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this
preference does not constitute "racial discrimination." Indeed, it
is not even a "racial" preference. Rather, it is an employment
criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian selfgovernment and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs
of its constituent groups.
The Court's distinction was not unjustified. As the Court explained,
68. Id. at 957.
69. See 417 U.S. at 538-39. For a detailed history of Mancari,see Carole Goldberg, What's Race
Got to Do With It? The Story of Morton v. Mancari, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 389 (Carole Goldberg
et al. eds., 2011).
70. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(2006)).
71. See Mancari,417 U.S. at 542.
72. See id.
73. See Goldberg, supra note 69, at 389.
74. Mancari,417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (quoting 44 Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual 335, 3.1).
75. Id. at 553-54.
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people who are Indian by descent (i.e., "racially" Indian), but not
members of recognized tribes, are not eligible for the preference. What
triggers the preference is the political status of being a tribal member.76
The rub, however, was that the BIA guidelines required, in addition to
tribal membership, one-fourth or more "Indian blood."7 7 The BIA
narrowed the political category (tribal members) further with the blood
quantum requirement. And this mixing of membership and blood
quantum has caused courts, especially those lacking background in
American Indian law, to question Mancari's neat distinction between
political membership and racial/ethnic category.
Courts and scholars have also struggled with what it means for
Congress to act in furtherance of its "unique obligation" to American
Indians. As Carole Goldberg and Addie Rolnick have pointed out,
Mancari has failed to fulfill its promise as an equal protection approach
that upholds the political relationship between tribes and the United
States but still scrutinizes federal actions that imposed unique burdens
on American Indians. Instead, courts have applied Mancari's rational
basis analysis regardless of whether the distinctive treatment of
American Indians furthered the political relationship between tribes and
the federal government or not. For example, in United States v.
Antelope,80 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the Major
Crimes Act,8 ' which subjects Indian defendants to federal prosecution
for crimes occurring on tribal lands and often results in harsher
convictions and sentences than would be meted out in state courts.82 The
Court cited and quoted Mancari, but failed to provide any analysis of
why a federal jurisdictional scheme for crimes by and against Native
people fell within the government's unique obligations to tribes.83
76. See id. at 553 n.24.
77. The archaic use of the term "blood quantum" has become naturalized, but itself is a racialized
term. See, e.g., ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON'T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN
AMERICA (2008); Paul Spruhan, A Legal History ofBlood Quantum in FederalIndian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006).

78. See infra Part IV (discussing cases questioning Mancari'sdistinction).
79. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 950, 959; Rolnick, supra note 9, at 993; see also Berger,;
supra note 36, at 1187 (reviewing post-Mancari cases and concluding that "these cases recite the
language of Mancari while utterly failing to explain its rationale or build on its potential").
80. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
82. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 648-50.
83. See id. at 644-47. The precise issue in Antelope was whether subjecting two Indian
defendants to a felony-murder prosecution under the Major Crimes Act violated the Equal
Protection Clause when the state in which the crime occurred had no felony-murder provision.
Under state law, the prosecution would have had to prove premeditation and deliberation, which are
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Instead of applying Mancari in a way that distinguished between the
federal government's discriminatory or baseless actions toward
American Indians on the one hand and actions that furthered the political
and trust relationship with tribes on the other, the Court collapsed the
analysis into a simple one-line formula: if the distinction is based on
tribes or tribal membership, it will be upheld. 8 4 Mancari has therefore
become an extension of Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs
rather than a way to thoughtfully plumb the distinctions between
oppressive federal treatment of Indians and treatment that furthers tribal
sovereignty and self-determination.
Finally, Mancari unwittingly furthers a dichotomy between
race/ethnicity and tribal membership that obscures the political nature of
race and ethnicity themselves. Blackness, as scholars have argued, is a
politico-legal category, as is whiteness.86 The legal constructions of race
have served political ends, and in this sense all racial categories are also
political categories. Thus while it is true that federal classifications
based on tribes and tribal membership are "political," it does not
necessarily follow that they are not racial, as that term is defined to
include the processes by which society has sorted people into racial
castes.
Legal doctrine flattens and obscures the politics that inhere in racial
categories, and tends, therefore, to perpetuate misconceptions about how
to redress discrimination across groups. Because racial categories have
unique histories, however, the legal implications that flow from them are
necessarily distinct.8 8 By extension, strategies to address the ongoing
structures of discrimination and subordination embedded in those legal
categories are likewise distinct. Unearthing the racialization of American
Indians that lies beneath the surface of the political classifications of

not elements under the federal felony-murder statute. See id. at 644.

84. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979); Del.
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
congressional action distributing judgment award to Delaware descendants that excluded Kansas
Delawares); see also Berger,supra note 36, at 1187 (canvassing the cases).
85. The formulaic application of Mancari's rule is part of what has led some courts astray in
more recent applications of equal protection analysis. These cases are discussed infra Part IV.
86. See L6PEZ, supra note 26; OMI & WINANT, supra note 26; Devon W. Carbado, Racial
Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633 (2005); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1707 (1993); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499-1504 (2005)
(describing socio-legal process of designation, delineation, and assignment of meaning of racial
categories).
87. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).

88. See Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28.
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tribes and tribal members, therefore, serves at least two purposes. First,
it aligns American Indians more clearly with all other groups that have
been subordinated by race. Second, it clarifies that each group's path to
anti-subordination must be as distinctive as the form of the racialization
itself.
Law plays a starring role in the construction of racial categories and
in how they are interpreted through the lens of equal protection today.
What it means to be African-American in the United States includes the
history of slavery, reconstruction, the dismantling of reconstruction, Jim
Crow, and the Civil Rights era.89 Likewise, what it means to be
American Indian, and even more obviously a member of a "federally
recognized tribe," is a product of the legal history of the United States'
interaction with and policies toward indigenous peoples. Therefore, to
understand Mancari's rule and where it fits in the larger socio-legal
landscape it is necessary to review the evolution of the "federally
recognized tribe."
B.

From Independent Sovereigns to FederallyRecognized Tribes

Today, the Department of the Interior maintains a list of tribes that are
recognized as political sovereigns by the federal government. 90 This
status places American Indian tribes and their members in a different
legal category (for certain purposes, and with important exceptions)
from other racial and ethnic groups. 91 To understand Mancari's political
relationship doctrine one must understand the history of how the federal
government arrived at the list of federally recognized tribes as well as
what does and does not flow from being on the list. With respect to the
former, the historical record reveals that the need for increasingly formal
definitions of tribes often (though not always) coincided with federal
policies aimed at one or more of the following goals: consolidating the
89. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in AntidiscriminationLaw, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 103, 112-16 (summarizing
history of legal, social and economic forms of constructing blackness as subordinate).
90. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.5(a) (2012) (requiring the Department of the Interior to publish a list of all
federally recognized tribes no less frequently than once every three years); Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 75
Fed. Reg. 60,810 (Oct. 1, 2010) (most recently published list).
91. Members of unacknowledged and terminated tribes are, in some instances, entitled to similar
programs and benefits as federally recognized tribes. See Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With
Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1470-76
(1991). At the same time, Native Americans are also eligible, as members of underrepresented
minority groups, for federal programs aimed at remedying past discrimination on similar terms as
other minority groups. See id. at 1488-89.
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federal government's authority over Indian affairs, pushing tribes onto
well-defined (and smaller) territories, and assimilating tribes and tribal
members into the majority society. With respect to what does and does
not flow from federal recognition, the most significant implications are
acknowledgement of tribal self-government and inherent sovereign
powers (and all of the legal implications, including freedom from state
laws, that result from that status),92 and the federal government's trust
obligation (as troubled as the trust relationship may be). In addition,
with federal recognition comes eligibility for federal programs that
benefit tribal members. 94
1.

History ofFederal Recognition

Legal scholars point to several key judicial, legislative, and executive
decisions when they describe the criteria and definitions for federally
recognized tribes. With respect to case law, the Supreme Court's
definitions in Montoya v. United States,9 5 United States v. Sandoval,96
and the First Circuit's in PassamaquoddyTribe v. Morton97 provided the
basic framework for the common law definition of a recognized Indian
tribe. In terms of legislation, the IRA purported to sort tribes into two
groups, those eligible for the federal government's services and trust
relationship, and those not. And finally, in 1978 the Executive Branch,
responding to a wave of litigation over land claims and the attendant
issue of federal recognition, promulgated regulations requiring a list of
all federally recognized tribes and criteria for unrecognized tribal groups
92. See generally COHEN, supra note 42, at ch.4-ch.7 (providing a detailed overview of these
areas of American Indian law).
93. The trust relationship includes specific legal and fiduciary obligations as well as a general
duty to protect and safeguard tribes as separate governments. But the trust obligations are also
amorphous and difficult to enforce, and have sometimes been used against tribes due to a
formulation that imports the dated understandings of dependency and subordination. See Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Trust We Can Trust: The Role of the Trust Doctrine in the
Management of Tribal Natural Resources, in TRIBES, LAND, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (Sarah
Krakoff & Ezra Rosser eds., 2012).
94. Though, some federal programs are available to Indians who are not members of federally
recognized tribes, and in the case of federal criminal jurisdiction, "membership" is defined more
expansively than in other contexts. The varied definitions for eligibility for programs and criminal
prosecution hint at the difficulty of cabining the federal government's obligations to indigenous
peoples to the formally defined list of recognized tribes. It is, nonetheless, an important starting
point for excavating the inextricably political relationship between tribes and the federal
government.
95. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
96. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
97. 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
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to obtain recognition through an administrative process.98 These legal
moments and definitions are embedded in the gradual historical process
of tribes evolving from free and independent sovereigns that predated
European settlement into entities locked, by legal and extralegal acts,
into an exclusive relationship with the United States.
a.

1783-1871: Sorting "Friends"from "Enemies"

Given the United States' early and recurring interest in resolving
indigenous land and resource claims, one might expect the early
appearance of some sort of legal definition of an Indian tribe. Yet
according to legal historian William W. Quinn, "In fact, the historical
record reveals a consistent uncertainty and even confusion on the part of
the several branches of government of the United States about its
relations with and legal responsibilities toward certain Indian tribes
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." 99 Quinn divides
the history into three phases prior to 1978, when the federal
acknowledgment criteria were promulgated.100 The first phase, from
1783-1871, was characterized largely by what Quinn labels the
"cognitive" type, meaning that the use of the terms "recognized" and
"acknowledged" did not have a jurisdictional meaning but rather
indicated that the federal government knew of the tribe's existence.o
Within this cognitive type, the federal government had several
categories. The fifth iteration of the Trade and Intercourse Act,' 02 for
example, included the following designations for Indians and Indian
tribes:
[T]hose whose lands were "secured by treaty with the United
States" (as against those whose lands were not); those "in amity
with" the United States; "friendly Indian tribes"; and "Indians
98. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 43
Fed. Reg. 39361 (Aug. 24, 1978) (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2012)).
99. Quinn, supra note 64, at 332.
100. See id. A necessary precursor to the first phase is the colonial recognition of American
Indian sovereignty. See id. at 336-38 (summarizing the legacy of the colonial period as "a heritage
that recognized, albeit sometimes grudgingly, the sovereignty of Indian tribes relative to the
continent"). Quinn's three phases are 1783-1871, 1871-1934, and 1934-1978. See id. This Article
uses the same dates to organize the discussion here, but emphasize different aspects of the United
States' developing definition of "federally recognized tribes." Quinn emphasizes the increasing
formality of the definition, in largely descriptive fashion. The analysis here takes a more critical
look at the components of the evolving definition of tribes and the forces behind the need for
formalization.
101. See id. at 339.
102. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
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living on lands surrounded by settlements of the citizens of the
United States, and being within the ordinary jurisdiction of any
of the individual states."' 03
As the nineteenth century proceeded and the United States gradually
expanded its territory across the continent, the need arose for a more
precise accounting of which indigenous peoples might stand in the way
of western settlement. To meet this need, in 1822, Jedidiab Morse
published a report commissioned by the Secretary of War that undertook
to list and categorize all tribes as well as report on their conditions.104
Morse distinguished so-called civilized from uncivilized tribes, the
former being those on the western edge of American settlement and the
latter the New England tribes, whose earlier encounter with colonists
and settlers had resulted in their subjugation and assimilation. For
example, Morse described the Osage as being in "moral darkness" with
no knowledge of god,105 prone to "mischievous and atrocious
expedition[s],"l 06 and having little hope for improvement without the
influence of religious instruction. 107 By contrast, the Passamaquoddy of
Maine were described favorably, under the care of the Catholics, and
with a governor who is "pious, and well disposed to receive
instruction., 10 8 This same alignment of negative characteristics
(uncivilized, wild, lacking god, etc.) with persistent tribal affiliation, and
positive characteristics (pious, receptive to instruction, etc.) with
assimilation, was relied on in the 1860 Census to sort Indians into the
categories of "civilized" or "retaining their tribal character."' 09 This
dichotomy, which reflects the distinct ways in which Indians were
racialized,"o would also emerge and recur later as the federal
government attempted to impose greater juridical meaning on the
distinction between "tribes" and groups of assimilated Indians.' "
In the 1830s, the United States' removal policies heightened the need
103. Id. at 341 (quoting Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13,

§ 12,

2 Stat. 139).

104. JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES ON

INDIAN AFFAIRS (1822), availableat http://hdl.handle.net/20271hvd.32044014221147.
105. Id. at 233.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 65.
See O'Brien, supra note 91, at 1464 n.8 (citing CENSUS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,

REPORT ON INDIANS TAXED AND INDIANS NOT TAXED IN THE UNITED STATES (EXCEPT ALASKA)
AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890, at 15 (1894)).

110. See Berger,supra note 9, at 606.
111. See infra notes 155-63 and 174-80 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876) and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)).
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to label and categorize Indian tribes.' 12 Removal of the Cherokee, Creek,
Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole from their homelands in the
Southeast required, at a minimum, the identification of which tribes still
had possessory interests in their lands." 3 Similarly, the removal and
consolidation of tribes throughout the west onto smaller homelands
necessitated categorizing tribes into those that would be provided federal
services and Indian agents and those that would not.114 During this
period, Chief Justice Marshall decided the last two cases in his Indian
law trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia's and Worcester v. Georgia.'16
Cherokee Nation, which held that Indian tribes were "domestic
dependent nations" retaining aspects of their pre-contact sovereignty but
implicitly divested of their powers over foreign affairs, took steps
toward defining the jurisdictional implications of being a tribe but did
not otherwise shed light on the criteria necessary to achieve that
status." 7 Likewise, Worcester, which held that state laws had no force or
effect within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation even in the midst of
the Removal era, shed significant light on the legal effects of tribal
sovereign status."'8 Yet Worcester, like Cherokee Nation, had no need to
address the criteria for being a tribe because the Cherokee had entered
into treaties with the United States." 9
In the decades following the Civil War, all three branches of
government began to use "acknowledged" and "recognized" in ways that
accord with the present jurisdictional meaning, rather than in the
cognitive sense that predominated previously.120 In The Kansas
Indians,121 the Supreme Court made the first foray into defining tribes
for jurisdictional purposes. The case involved whether Kansas could tax
lands owned by individual Indians from the Shawnee, Wea, and Miami
tribes.12 2 In rejecting Kansas' imposition of the tax, the Court explained
112. See COHEN, supra note 42,

§ 1.03[4].

113. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 342-43.
114. Id. at 343-44 (discussing the Indian Removal Act, Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat.
411; the Act establishing the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Act of July 9, 1832, ch. 174,
§4, 4 Stat. 564; and the final Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat.
729).
115. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
116. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
See 31 U.S.(6 Pet.) at 561.
See id. at 551-52 (describing Treaty terms).
See Quinn, supra note 64, at 347.
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
Id. at 737.
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that if each tribe's political organizations were preserved intact and
"recognized by the political department of the government as existing,
then they are a 'people distinct from others,' capable of making treaties,
separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed
exclusively by the government of the Union."' 23 The Court's conclusion
rested on the tribes' treaty with the United States as well as on the tribes'
degree of political and legal organization:
The treaty of 1854 left the Shawnee people a united tribe, with a
declaration of their dependence on the National government for
protection and the vindication of their rights. Ever since this
their tribal organization has remained as it was before. They
have elective chiefs and an elective council; meeting at stated
periods; keeping a record of their proceedings; with powers
regulated by custom; by which they punish offences, adjust
differences, and exercise a general oversight over the affairs of
the nation. This people have their own customs and laws by
which they are governed.12 4
The Court's language, while occasionally exhibiting the assumption
of Indian inferiority endemic to the times, 125 nonetheless embraced a
political understanding of the definition of an Indian tribe. The Court
concluded that "the action of the political department of the government
settles, beyond controversy, that the Shawnees are as yet a distinct
people, with a perfect tribal organization."1 26
b.

1871-1934: Assimilation of the Individual and Racializationof the
Tribe

Most Indian law scholars define the years from 1887-1928 as the
Allotment and Assimilation period in federal Indian policy.12 7 Like most
123. Id. at 755.
124. Id. at 756.
125. See id. The Court's language is disparaging, yet it is also embedded in an overall recognition
of the tribes' well-functioning governmental status and structures.
Because some of those customs have been abandoned, owing to the proximity of their white
neighbors, may be an evidence of the superior influence of our race, but does not tend to prove
that their tribal organization is not preserved. There is no evidence in the record to show that
the Indians with separate estates have not the same rights in the tribe as those whose estates are
held in common. Their machinery of government, though simple, is adapted to their
intelligence and wants, and effective, with faithful agents to watch over them.
Id. Both its content and tone are therefore far less overtly discriminatory than in United States v.
Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), and Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901), discussed below.
126. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 756.
127. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 105

(2d ed. 2010); DELORIA & LYTLE, supranote 49, at 8.
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historical periodization, there is an arbitrary quality to the dates. Some
Allotment and Assimilation policies predated 1887.128 In addition, in
1871, Congress enacted a statute purporting to limit the President's
power to enter into treaties with tribes.12 9 For the topic at hand, the 1871
date is an appropriate starting point. It marks the beginning of a period
that necessitated definitions of tribes in order to freeze their numbers
and, eventually, eliminate them. Similarly, 1934 is the better ending
point, because it marks the official end of allotment with the passage of
the IRA, which also included the first attempt to list all federally
recognized tribes. 130
The 1871 Act announced that "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe
within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty." 1 31The legislation was initiated by
members of the House of Representatives who resented that treaties
ratified by the Senate repeatedly forced the House's hand with respect to
appropriations. 132 Yet declaring that the government would no longer
enter into treaties did nothing to alter the fact that there were many
Indian tribes remaining with valid claims to territory and selfgovernance: "The BIA, if not Congress, was acutely aware of the
existence of numerous Indian Tribes in the western states with no treaty
relations between them and the United States. Some new criterion or
criteria would have to be adopted to determine from henceforth which
tribes would be provided services."l 3 3 Congress's attempt to end treaty
making with tribes did not, in other words, erase the existence of tribes
themselves. The 1871 Act, therefore, begged the question of some
further way to define and take account of those tribes. In 1872, a year
after the legislation was enacted, Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Francis Walker "asked this rhetorical question: 'How are Indians, never

128. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 49, at 8 (describing pre-1887 allotment policies and
laws).
129. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2006)). While the statute appeared to bring an end to treaty making, in reality, the federal
government continued to enter into various agreements, carried out through executive order or
legislation, with Indian tribes as political bodies. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 90-91.
Furthermore, scholars and at least one Justice have raised questions about the constitutionality of the
provision. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); David P. Currie, Indian Treaties, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 445 (2007).
130. See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act).
131. 16 Stat. at 566.
132. See Currie, supranote 129, at 447.
133. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 347.
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yet treated with, but having every way as good and as complete rights to
portions of our territory as had the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and
Chickasaws, for instance . . . to establish their rights?"'l 34 Solving the
perennial "Indian problem" by revoking the treaty power created a new
one: how otherwise to address and resolve outstanding Indian claims.
Most scholars describe Allotment as beginning in 1887 because this
was the year that the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act,135 was
passed. East Coast organizations and Western politicians agitated for the
break-up of tribal governments and, in particular, the tribal land base
that made tribal cultural and political life possible. 136 According to these
constituencies, tribes' separate status, which allowed them to perpetuate
their traditions and culture, had to be destroyed in order to allow
individual Indians to assimilate successfully in to American society. As
Professor Berger has described, during this period "[fjederal Indian
policy, which previously vacillated between sovereign and racialized
views of tribes, moved decisively toward the latter."137 E.P. Smith,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs during 1874-1876, opined that "the
difficulty of Indian 'civilization' is '[n]ot so inherent in the racecharacter and disposition of the Indian . . . as in his anomalous relation
to the Government."' 138 The racialized tribe was seen as the locus of
Indian backwardness and inferiority. Destruction of the tribe was
therefore prerequisite to liberating the individual Indian.13 9
The Dawes Act's primary means for accomplishing the goal of tribal
destruction was to shatter the tribally held land base. The Act authorized
the break-up of tribal land into individually held allotments for tribal
members and the declaration of any surplus lands as open for non-Indian
settlement. 14 0 In order to allot the lands, the Act and related allotment
statutes required many tribes to develop membership rolls. 141 As one of

134. Id.

(quoting

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN

AFFAIRS

TO THE

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 83 (1872)).

135. Indian General Allotment Act, chs. 105, 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2006)).
136. See AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN":

1880-1900 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) [hereinafter AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS]

(collected writings and speeches by the Friends of the Indian in support of allotment and
assimilation); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 49, at 8-9.
137. Berger, supra note 9, at 629.
138. Quinn, supra note 64, at 347 (quoting ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 374 (1874)).

139. See id. at 347 (describing attitudes of federal officials towards tribes during allotment).
140. 24 Stat. 388.
141. See Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645 (authorizing the Dawes commission
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the Friends of the Indians put it at their annual gathering in Mohonk,
New York, the Allotment policy was "a mighty pulverizing engine for
breaking up the tribal mass."1 4 2 Much of this work would be
accomplished through allotment, as well as the subsequent process of
releasing individual Indian allotments from restrictions on alienability.143
As Paul Spruhan has documented, the criteria for determining who
should be released from restrictions on alienation was based on intricate
and byzantine rules about blood quantum, particularly for the Cherokee,
Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw of Oklahoma.14 4
The process of developing tribal rolls, and then using those rolls to
disburse land as individual allotments in order to eliminate their trust
status, has had lingering harmful effects on tribes and individual
Indians.14 5 In some instances, people of unquestionable tribal affiliation
were omitted from the rolls simply by oversight or unseemly
bureaucratic delay. Professor Eva Marie Garroutte has described how
"[t]he compilation of some tribal rolls . . . took so long that a significant
number of registrants
died
before
the paperwork
was
completed.... Even when an applicant did manage to live long enough
to complete the entire process of enrollment, she frequently found
herself denied." 4 6 In other cases, tribal people refused to be listed on the
government's rolls as acts of protest against the allotment process: "For
instance, among Oklahoma Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and
Choctaws conservative traditionalists or 'irreconcilables' fought a hard
fight against registration with the Dawes commission." 47 The tragic

to establish tribal membership for Five Civilized Tribes); see also Spruhan, supranote 77, at 40-41
(discussing the Dawes Commission's process for these tribes).
142. AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 136, at 342.
143. See Spruhan,supra note 77, at 40-41.

144. See id. at 41 ("With each group accounted for, Congress moved to make lands alienable
based on the race and blood quantum of the allottees. First, Congress released whites and freedmen
in 1904, called 'Indians who are not of Indian blood' in the statute, from restrictions on the sale of
all their allotted land except their homesteads. In 1906 Congress extended the time for restrictions
for full bloods, and required that the Secretary of Interior approve full-blood leases, sales, and wills
devising allotments. In 1908 Congress released Indians from restrictions on the sale of their
allotments by their amount of Indian blood. Those Indians of less than one-half Indian blood, along
with intermarried citizens and freedmen, were released from all restrictions. Those of one-half or
more Indian blood, but less than three-quarters Indian blood, were released from restrictions on all
their land but their homestead. Those of three-quarters or more Indian blood retained restrictions on
all their land.") (citations omitted).
145. See EVA MARIE GARROUTTE, REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE

AMERICA 21-22 (2003); Spruhan, supra note 77, at 41 n.352 (describing freedmen litigation).
146. GARROUTTE, supra note 145, at 21.
147. Id.
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irony is that "the descendants of those traditionalists find themselves
worse off, in the modem, legal context," because today they cannot be
enrolled members of their tribes.148
Sometimes tribal rolls were constructed explicitly to facilitate tribal
approval of land cessions to the federal government. According to
Professor Garroutte, "Prior to 1892, agents of American government had
judged mixed bloods more cooperative than full bloods on a variety of
issues, particularly in the signing of legal documents allowing for land
cessions. The agents had therefore specifically sought them out for such
purposes."l 4 9 Garroutte quotes the Annual Report of Thomas J. Morgan,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which urged the recognition of mixed
bloods as tribal members for just this purpose:
Where by treaty or law it has been required that three-fourths of
an Indian tribe shall sign any subsequent agreement to give it
validity, we have accepted the signature of mixed bloods as
sufficient, and have treated said agreements as valid for the
purpose of relinquishment of the rights of the tribe.... To
decide at this time that such mixed bloods are not
Indian ... would unsettle or endanger the titles to much of the
lands that have been relinquishedby Indian tribes and patented
to citizens of the United States.150
Taking this approach a step further, David H. Jerome, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs in 1892, advocated including non-Indians on the tribal
rolls in order to increase the chances of a vote in support of allotting the
Kiowa Tribe's reservation.15 1
Given the aims and assumptions of the 1871 Act and the Dawes Act,
it is not surprising that their contributions to defining American Indian
tribes were indirect. The 1871 Act aimed to freeze the definition in time,
notwithstanding the existence of many tribes with obvious claims to
territory still outstanding. The Dawes Act (and accompanying laws)
defined members of tribes only in order to eventually extinguish the
tribes through the process of eliminating tribal land and culture. The
goals of both were to eliminate the federal government's obligations to

148. Id. at 22.
149. Id. at 36.
150. Id. (omission

in original) (emphasis

added) (quoting THOMAS J. MORGAN, U.S.

COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, SixTY FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 36 (1892)).

151. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 116 (quoting Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

SINCE THE 1880's 215, 216 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984)).
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treat tribes and their members as distinct peoples, with rights and
statuses separate from those of ordinary U.S. citizens. As such, the fewer
tribes the better, and likewise the fewer individuals affiliated with tribes
the better. During this period, the inverse racial logic that applied to
Indians as opposed to African-Americans was at its height.'5 2 At the
same time that the federal government was eliminating special
protections for Indian individuals on the basis of their insufficient blood
quantum (and sometimes constructing tribal rolls deliberately in order to
diminish the number of "full blood" Indians), the Supreme Court
sanctioned the "one drop" approach to defining black identity in Plessy
v. Ferguson.53 Elimination of Indians as a "race" would result in more
land held as private property by non-Indians, whereas strict and
purportedly biological separation between whiteness and blackness, as
determined by blood quantum even in minute degrees, served the ends of
maintaining free and low-wage labor even after the Civil War.15 4
During this same historical period, the Supreme Court decided several
cases that necessitated some working definition of what constituted a
tribe. In United States v. Joseph,'55 the Court considered the question of
whether the Pueblo of Taos was a "tribe" under the Nonintercourse
Act, 15 which prohibited non-Indian settlement on Indian lands and
subjected violators to fines.157 The Court determined that the Pueblo was
not a tribe under the Act because the Pueblo people were too civilized to

152. See Wolfe, Land,Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 881-82, 887.
153. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See also Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Diference, supra note 28, at 882
(noting that the trend after Plessy "was steadily in the direction of what came to be known as the
'one-drop rule,' in which any evidence of any African ancestry whatsoever, no matter how far back
or remote, meant that one was classified as black"); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 283-85 (describing rules of hypodescent and other
blood quantum approaches to determining blackness). As Harris notes, "The standards were
designed to accomplish what mere observation could not: 'That even Blacks who did not look Black
were kept in their place."' Id. at 284 (quoting R.T. Diamond & R.J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste:
Louisiana's Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255,
281 (1983)).
154. See Harris,supra note 39, at 284-86; Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at
879-84, 886-88. The intensification of both forms of racialization is no coincidence. As Patrick
Wolfe notes, "Despite [the] fundamental discrepancy between the racialization of Indians and of
blacks, in either case we find race intensifying when social space becomes, or threatens to become,
shared." Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 887.
155. 94 U.S. 614 (1876), abrogatedby United States. v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
156. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).
157. See 94 U.S. at 615 (citing to various provisions prohibiting settlement on Indian lands in the
Territories of New Mexico and Utah). The 1834 Act declared it illegal for anyone to settle on lands
"belonging, secured, or granted by treaty with the United States to any Indian tribe." Id. The 1851
amendment extended the Act to the Territories of New Mexico and Utah. Id.
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require the ward-guardian relationship that warranted protection from
non-Indian settlement.158 Quoting the lower court, the Court stated:
For centuries, . . . the pueblo Indians have lived in villages, in

fixed communities, each having its own municipal or local
government. As far as their history can be traced, they have been
a pastoral and agricultural people, raising flocks and cultivating
the soil..

.

. They are as intelligent as most nations or people

deprived of means or facilities for education. Their names, their
customs, their habits, are similar to those of the people in whose
midst they reside, or in the midst of whom their pueblos are
situated.

...

In short, they are

a peaceable,

industrious,

intelligent, honest, and virtuous people. They are Indians only in
feature, complexion, and a few of their habits; in all other
respects superior to all but a few of the civilized Indian tribes of
59
the country, and the equal of the most civilized thereof'1
The tribes protected by the Act, according to the Court, were "the
nomadic Apaches, Comanches, Navajoes, and other tribes whose
incapacity for self-government required both for themselves and for the
citizens of the country this guardian care of the general government." 60
The Court concluded that the Pueblo was not a tribe under the Act
because their stability, degree of assimilation, and history of integration
into the former Mexican government rendered them no different from
other communally-oriented non-Indian communities:
If the pueblo Indians differ from the other inhabitants of New
Mexico in holding lands in common, and in a certain patriarchal
form of domestic life, they only resemble in this regard the
Shakers and other communistic societies in this country, and
cannot for that reason be classed with the Indian tribes of whom
we have been speaking. 16 1
Joseph's definition, limited as it was to the Nonintercourse Act,
nonetheless reflected the evolving idea that inferiority and incapacity
inhered in the meaning of the word "tribe." The Pueblo's "superior"
social organization, habits, and degree of assimilation rendered them,
ironically, less protected in their lands than the "semi-independent tribes
whom our government has always recognized as exempt from our laws,
whether within or without the limits of an organized State or
158. Joseph's holding with respect to whether Pueblos are tribes and Pueblo lands are Indian
country has since been rejected. See, e.g., Candelaria,271 U.S. 432.
159. Joseph, 94 U.S. at 616-17 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 617.
161. Id. at 617-18.
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Territory."1 6 2 Despite Joseph's degraded view of the tribes warranting
Nonintercourse Act protection, the Court nonetheless recognized that
political and legal independence were key elements of the definition of a
tribe: tribes were "in regard to their domestic government, left to their
own rules and traditions; in whom we have recognized the capacity to
make treaties, and with whom the governments, state and national, deal,
with a few exceptions only, in their national or tribal character, not as
individuals." 6 3
In Montoya v. United States, decided in 1901, the question was

whether a claim could be sustained against the United States under an
act that provided compensation for depredations committed by "Indians
belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United
States."'" The alleged depredations had been committed by members of
the Mescalero Apache Tribe, who had joined with a band of Chiricahua
Apache Indians led by Victoria.' 6 ' The Court determined that these
actions were not covered by the act because Victoria's band, far from
being "in amity with" the United States, had defied attempts to be settled
and relocated, fled to Mexico, and been pursued by U.S. troops
throughout the Southwest, all the while defying federal authority.'6 6
While the decision could have been confined to the question of what it
meant to be "in amity" with the United States, the Court nonetheless
gave considerable attention to the distinctions between the terms
"nation," "tribe," and "band."
Despite the clear language of the Act, which included the term
"nation" as a possible descriptor for a collection of Indian people, the
Montoya Court was disdainful: "The North American Indians do not,
and never have, constituted 'nations' as that word is used by writers
upon international law, although in a great number of treaties they are
designated as 'nations' as well as tribes."1 67 The Court's first basis for
rejecting the term "nation" was purely formalistic.16 8 However, Montoya
162. Id. at 617.
163. Id.
164. 180 U.S. 261, 264 (1901) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851).
165. Id. at 270.
166. See id. at 269.
167. Id. at 265.
168. See id. According to Montoya, "The word 'nation' as ordinarily used presupposes or implies
an independence of any other sovereign power more or less absolute, an organized government,
recognized officials, a system of laws, definite boundaries, and the power to enter into negotiations
with other nations." Id. Rejecting nationhood for Native peoples on this basis reinforced a selfreferential imperialism, but it at least resonated with federal Indian law's "domestic dependent
nation" formula.
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did not rest there. According to the Court, their "natural" inferiority
prevented Indians from forming nations:

Owing to the natural infirmities of the Indian character, their
fiery tempers, impatience of restraint, their mutual jealousies
and animosities, their nomadic habits, and lack of mental
training, they have as a rule shown a total want of that cohesive
force necessary to the making up of a nation in the ordinary
sense of the word.169
These disparaging and uninformed generalizations were not unique to
Montoya. Chief Justice Marshall relied on similar ones in Johnson v.
M'Intosh.o Yet the heightened rhetoric is a contrast to The Kansas
Indians, decided thirty-five years earlier, which at least recognized the
tribes'

well-established governmental

and legal structures.' 7 ' The

Montoya Court's much more debased description of Indian political and
legal organization, at the height of the Allotment period, served and
reflected the policy priorities of the times.
Consistent with those goals, after Montoya rejected the label "nation,"
the opinion turned to the question of how to define "tribes," and
included the criterion of racial similarity: "By a 'tribe' we understand a

body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though
Having concluded that Indians
sometimes ill-defined territory ....
lacked the sophistication necessary to form governing structures that
would allow for membership to be defined in ways other than by race,
the Court inevitably defined "tribes" in racial terms. As William Quinn
has correctly observed, Montoya is known in Indian law circles as the
first case to articulate a set of criteria for defining a federally recognized

tribe. 7 3 It is therefore noteworthy that embedded in this early definition
is a racialized understanding, rooted in the dogma of the times and
departing from earlier articulations, that assumed Indian inferiority and
lack of civilization.
United States v. Sandoval, decided twelve years later, sounded a
similar note. 174 Like United States v. Joseph, the question involved the
application of a federal law to one of the Pueblos of New Mexico. By its
169. Id.
170. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
171. See supra discussion at notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing The Kansas
Indians).
172. Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266.
173. See Quinn, supranote 64, at 352.
174. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
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own terms, the law in Sandoval, which banned the introduction of
alcohol into Indian country, applied to the Pueblos. The Court therefore
addressed the prior question, which was the extent to which Congress
could declare unilaterally that a group was an Indian tribe. The Court
concluded that Congress had wide latitude in this arena, so long as its
designation was not arbitrary.' 75 To act within its broad powers,
Congress had to legislate with respect to "distinctly Indian
communities."l 7 6 Sandoval's rough criteria included (1) whether the
legislative and executive branches consistently treated the Pueblos as
"dependent communities entitled to [their] aid and protection," and (2)
whether the Pueblos' "Indian lineage, isolated and communal life,
primitive customs and limited civilization," rendered Congress's
decision well within its broad discretion.17 7 Sandoval's definition, like
Montoya's, therefore included both some idea of lineage (dubbed "race"
in Montoya)'7 8 and separateness, but in both cases separateness was
defined by inferiority and the need for the federal government's
paternalistic protection.17 9 Indeed, in an interesting reversal from Joseph,
which relied on the Pueblos' relative civilization to support the
conclusion that their lands should not be covered by the Nonintercourse
Act, the Sandoval Court referred at length to various Indian
Commissioners' reports that described the Pueblos as not ready for
civilization, the main evidence of which was their refusal to abandon
their traditional religious and political practices (described disparagingly
as pagan and autocratic). 80
To summarize, at the dawn of the twentieth century, which was also
the height of the Allotment era, the judicial and legislative definitions of
tribes and tribal members reflected both the crushing and paternalistic
versions of the federal government's "ward-guardian" relationship with
tribes (pursuant to Montoya and Sandoval) and the hardening of descentbased understandings of tribal membership (under Allotment statutes
and associated policies). Both served the larger political goals of, on the
one hand, narrowing the federal government's obligations to tribes to
actions that would ready them for assimilation, and on the other,
shrinking the tribal land base through allotment to individual tribal
members. Politics were therefore entangled in these emerging
175. Id. at 46.

176. Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at 47.
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 47; Montoya, 180 U.S. at 256-66.
See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 40-45.

2012]

INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL

1075

jurisdictional definitions of the federally recognized tribe and its
members, which simultaneously relied on and constructed racialized
(and racially discriminatory) depictions of Indians.
c.

1934-1978: The Indian ReorganizationAct and the Formalization
ofFederalRecognition

From 1913, when Sandoval was decided, until the end of the
allotment era, there was relatively little activity with respect to defining
tribes or tribal members."' In 1934, the IRA swept aside Allotment
policies, instituted the "Indian New Deal," and for the first time
standardized federal tribal status. The IRA listed three classifications of
Indians authorized to form tribal governments and receive government
services: "'recognized' tribes, descendants of recognized tribes residing
on a reservation in 1934, and other persons of one-half or more Indian
blood."182 According to William Quinn, "[r]ecognition had become, at
last, a declaration, and its usage had shifted from a cognitive sense to a
wholly jurisdictional sense."' 83 The IRA authorized a list of 258 tribes as
eligible to participate in voting on the question of whether to reorganize
under the Act or not. While not heralded as such, this was the first
constructive list of federally recognized tribes.184
The formalization of tribal status inevitably raised questions about
how to gain that status. Many tribes were left off of the IRA's initial list,
and the question for them was how to obtain formal federal recognition,
and what criteria would apply. Two groups, Alaska and Oklahoma
Natives, were covered by subsequent IRA-style legislation.' 8 ' But for the
many tribes that simply fell through the cracks, some additional process
was required. The job of considering whether groups omitted from the
list could be considered tribes fell to the Department of the Interior.
Fortunately for the petitioning tribal groups, the post-IRA period
181. In 1916, the lone Band of Miwok Indians submitted the first request for tribal recognition to
the BIA. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 354. But in the absence of any standard policy, process or
criteria for recognition, granting federal recognition was both arbitrary and uncertain in terms of its
enduring effect. See ELMER R. RuscO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 22 (2000).

182. MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TRIBES: UNRECOGNIZED INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL

ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS 28 (2004) (citing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48
Stat. 934 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2006)).
183. Quinn, supra note 64, at 356.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 356-57 (citing to the Alaska Reorganization Act of 1936, Act of May 1, 1936, ch.
254, 49 Stat. 1250, and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat.
1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (2006)).
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coincided with Felix Cohen's tenure at the Department of the Interior,
during which he authored many of the Solicitor's opinions concerning
recognition. During that period, Cohen also compiled his masterful
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which outlined the criteria for

determining which tribes could be federally recognized. Factors that
favored recognition included: (1) "[t]hat the group has had treaty
relations with the United States;" (2) "[t]hat the group has been
denominated a tribe by act of Congress or Executive Order;" (3) "[t]hat
the group has been treated as having collective rights in tribal lands or
funds, even though not expressly designated a tribe;" (4) "[t]hat the
group has been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian tribes;" and (5)
"[t]hat the group has exercised political authority over its members,
through a tribal council or other governmental forms."186 Notably,
Cohen's definition dropped the racial aspects of the common law tests
from Montoya and Sandoval (both in their emphasis on race and lineage,
as well as in their discriminatory assignment of inferior characteristics)
and emphasized instead the federal government and other tribes' de facto
treatment of the group as a tribe as well as the group's own internal
political organization. 87
The IRA and its aftermath thus added a further dimension to the
political nature of the federally recognized tribe. In the process of
formalizing the list of tribes and articulating the criteria for getting on
the list, internal political organization became more important than
ethnographic history. Groups that were unquestionably lineal
descendants of aboriginal peoples were nonetheless sometimes ineligible
for federal recognition. For example, in an opinion rejecting tribal status
for the St. Croix Chippewa, the Solicitor noted that the St. Croix had not
retained a distinct political structure, as compared to other bands such as
Mole Lake.' 88 Similarly, in interpreting the Oklahoma Indian Welfare
Act,189 the Solicitor opined that:
186. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 271 (1942); see also COHEN, supra
note 42,

§ 3.02;

see generally DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN

AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007).
187. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 359 (describing ascendance, in Solicitor's Opinions during the
1930s, of criterion of internal political organization for tribal recognition).
188. Id. ("While the St. Croix Indians... might have been recognized as a separate band at the
time of the 1854 treaty, they now present no characteristics entitling them to recognition as a band,
particularly as there exists no form of band organization, as there does in the Mole Lake group.")
(omission in original) (quoting Nathan R. Margold, Memorandum to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs (Feb. 8, 1937), in I OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917-1974, 724, 725 (1974) [hereinafter OPINIONS OF THE
SOLICITOR]).

189. Act ofJune 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (2006)).
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It is not enough that the ethnographic history [of the tribes in
question] shows them in the past to have been distinct and wellrecognized tribes or bands..

.

. There must be a currently

existing group distinct and functioning as a group in certain
respects and recognition of such activity must have been shown
by [the U.S. government].' 90
In the years following the IRA's passage, questions about tribes that
were omitted from the list arose periodically, and were decided
according to the Cohen criteria described above.191 The recognition
process slowed in the late 1930s, and then paused abruptly after World
War II, when the federal government adopted policies aimed at
eliminating the federal status of tribes. The Termination era, as it is
known,192 included congressional action terminating the federal/tribal
government-to-government relationship with 109 tribes.1 3 Termination
decisions were based in part on a 1953 study commissioned by the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which purported to
assess tribes for their suitability to be set free from federal
superintendence. The House Report relied on the IRA list for its
definition of an existing federally recognized tribe.1 94 Ironically, it was
therefore this anti-tribal initiative that formalized an administrative list
and definition of tribes that persisted until 1978.'9' The Termination era
ended almost as suddenly as it began. The Secretary of the Interior
declared, in 1959, that "no Indian tribe or group should end its
relationship with the Federal Government unless ... the tribe or group
affected concurs in and supports the plan proposed."' 96 In the early
1960s, federal officials resumed the process of recognizing tribes that
had been omitted from the IRA list.

190. Id. (quoting Nathan R. Margold, Memorandum for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
(Dec. 13, 1938), in OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR supranote 188, at 864, 864).
191. The more complex cases are compiled in I OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917-1974 (1974). See also Quinn,
supra note 64, at 358.
192. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 142 (summarizing termination era and policies).
193. See id. at 144.
194. See Quinn,supra note 64, at 360-61 (citing H.R. REP. No. 82-2503, at 139 (1953)).
195. See id. at 361.
196. COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.07, at 99 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 3105 (1959) (remarks of
Sec'y of the Interior Fred A. Seaton)).
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1978-Present:Litigation to Prove Tribal Status and the Federal
Acknowledgment Process

The federal acknowledgment criteria and processes came under new
scrutiny in the 1970s. Tribes and tribal members, invigorated by selfdetermination policies, sought enforcement of long-neglected treaty
rights as well as redress for the federal government's many failures to
support tribal communities. 197 Responding to the surge of Indian
activism, Congress established the American Indian Policy Review
Commission, which examined a wide range of issues affecting Indian
tribes and people, including the number and status of tribes that had
never received federal recognition.'" The Commission's Task Force on
Terminated and Nonfederally Recognized Indians found that hundreds
of tribes had been overlooked for federal status due to the absence of a
uniform acknowledgement process, as well as the arbitrary
interpretations and actions of federal officials.199 The Commission
concluded that:
The results of "non-recognition" . . . has [sic] been devastating,

[including] the continued erosion of tribal lands, or the complete
loss thereof; the deterioration of cohesive, effective tribal
governments and social organizations; and the elimination of
special federal services, through the continued denial of such
services which the Indian communities in general appear to
desperately need.2 00
The Commission recommended an overhaul of the federal
government's acknowledgement criteria and processes to facilitate a
resolution for the many tribes unfairly overlooked or terminated from
recognition.
During the same period, tribes and tribal members litigated a range of
issues related to long-neglected treaty and statutory rights. In the Pacific
Northwest, tribes with treaty rights to fish at traditional off-reservation
sites won the right to take up to half of the commercial fish catch. 2 0 1 The
197. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS (2005) (recounting tribes' activism during the 1960s and 1970s to revive their legal rights
and invigorate tribal communities).
198. See I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 457-84 (1977).
199. See id.; see also TASK FORCE TEN: TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
INDIANS, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION (1976)

[hereinafter TASK FORCE TEN].
200. TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 199, at 1695.
201. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975).
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outcome raised questions about whether unrecognized tribes had the
same rights.20 2 In the Northeast, tribes whose land bases had been eroded
by violations of the Nonintercourse Act sought long overdue redress.
The Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine, pursuing claims against Maine and
Massachusetts for wrongful taking of Passamaquoddy property,
requested representation from the United States.2 03 The Department of
the Interior refused, arguing that the Passamaquoddy Tribe did not have
a trust relationship with the United States, and that the Tribe was not
entitled to protection under the Nonintercourse Act. 204 To secure the
federal government's representation, and therefore, be able to pursue its
claims against Maine, the Passamaquoddy first had to prevail on the
question of whether it was a "tribe" under the Nonintercourse Act.205
The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision that the
Passamaquoddy Tribe was a "tribe" within the meaning of the Act,
notwithstanding the absence of a federal treaty and the disavowal of
federal acknowledgement. The Passamaquoddy Tribe's obvious
distinctive political organization, its long history of treatment as a tribe
by the state of Maine, as well as early acknowledgement by federal
officials that the Tribe was entitled to federal protection, persuaded the
court that the Tribe "plainly fit[]" the definition of an Indian tribe
outlined in Montoya.206
Other tribal status questions were not so easily resolved, however.
Claims brought by the Mashpee Tribe of Indians raised difficult
questions about the extent to which a tribe could adopt assimilative
measures and still retain its status as a distinct political entity entitled to

202. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming tribal treaty rights
to up to one half of the commercial catch in Washington, but limiting eligibility to treaty signatories
and federally recognized tribes). The plight of unrecognized tribes whose fishing rights were never
acknowledged persists. See GARROUTTE, supra note 145, at 27 (describing Samish Tribe's plight
with respect to access to traditional fishing grounds and rights to catch salmon for ceremonies).
203. See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir.
1975).
204. See id. at 372-73 (describing how the Tribe sought a declaratory judgment that it was
entitled to federal protection under the Indian Nonintercourse Act after the federal government
refused to represent the Tribe in its claims against Maine based on an opinion by the Acting
Solicitor that the Tribe had no treaty with the United States and no other evidence of a trust
relationship).
205. See id. at 376.
206. Id. at 377 n.8. The court quoted Montoya's interpretation of "tribe" under the Act "to mean
a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community under one leadership or
government, and inhabiting a particular, though sometimes ill-defined, territory."' Id.; see also
supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text (discussing Montoya).
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federal protection.20 7 The Mashpee, who recently achieved federal
recognition through the acknowledgement process,20 8 initially lost their
case in the courts.209
Passamaquoddy, Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee,210 and other

contemporary legal battles over tribal recognition necessarily confront
the problematic role that race has historically played in defining tribal
status. Built into early attempts to distinguish Indian tribes from
everyone else was a consistent, if protean, conception of inferiority. The
mark of separateness was "separate because not civilized," or "separate
because not sophisticated." Thus while the most disparaging racialized
language from Montoya and Sandoval is excised in Passamaquoddy,the
idea of dependence, inferiority, and absence of assimilation remains:
The cases do, it is true, suggest that the Act's coverage is limited
to tribes consisting of "simple, uninformed people," an
interpretation understandable in light of the Act's protective
purpose. But it is not claimed that the Tribe and its members are
so sophisticated or assimilated as to be other than those entitled
211
to protection.
In Mashpee, the particular racialized expectations about tribal status
were even more prominent. The Mashpee Tribe survived through
colonial and post-revolutionary times (unlike many other Northeast
tribes that were utterly destroyed) by engaging in various assimilative
adaptations. Their success at doing so, which included their ability to
maintain what they believed to be superior rights to their ancestral lands,
was held against them in the legal determination of whether they had

207. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978). The Mashpee
case was high profile for a number of reasons. The idea of an Indian tribe persisting in the crowded
Northeast took many by surprise. The location of the Mashpee's land claim-stunning beach front
property on Cape Cod-caused consternation. And the mixed race appearance, and strong
Massachusetts accents, of many Mashpee did not accord with stereotypical expectations about
Indians. See Jo Carrillo, Identity as Idiom: Mashpee Reconsidered, 28 IND. L. REv. 511, 544 (1995);
Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating 'Yonnondio' by Precedent and Evidence: The
Mashpee Indian Case, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39 at 177, 185-87 (describing
Mashpee racial integration, political structure, and land claims). For an in-depth examination of the
case and its meanings, see generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 277-346 (1988).

208. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian
Tribal Council, Inc. of Massachusetts, 72 Fed. Reg. 8007, 8007 (Feb. 22, 2007) (effective May 23,
2007).
209. See Mashpee Tribe, 447 F. Supp. 940.
210. Id.
211. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 378 (1st Cir. 1975).
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remained a tribe.212 These cases heightened the need for a uniform way
of addressing tribal recognition claims according to criteria that did not
perpetuate the cycles of racialized paternalism embedded in the early
recognition cases.
The Commission's recommendations, together with the increase in
litigation over tribal status exemplified by Passamaquoddy and
Mashpee, ultimately prompted regulatory action. The BIA, flooded with
acknowledgment petitions, began the process of instituting uniform
criteria and clear procedures for tribes to petition for federal
21
recognition.213 It took yet another lawsuit, however, before the BIA
promulgated the final regulations for federal acknowledgement and
mandated publication of a list of all federally recognized tribes in
1978.214 The regulations, most recently amended in 1994,215 establish
seven criteria for tribal recognition. Tribes must show: (1) continuous
existence since 1900; (2) that a predominant portion of their membership
comes from a "distinct community"; (3) that the tribe has maintained
political influence over the community; (4) that the group, has
membership criteria; (5) that they descend from a historical Indian tribe
and have functioned as a single autonomous political entity; (6) that the
membership does not comprise members of a current federally
recognized tribe; and (7) that the group petitioning for acknowledgement
was not terminated by Congress.2 16
The federal acknowledgment criteria and processes have provided a
bureaucratic forum for resolution of the many claims by tribes that were
overlooked, inadvertently or otherwise. Yet, despite the BIA's stated
intention of removing both the politics and the caprice from the federal
acknowledgement process, scholars have argued that the process
remains rife with both.217 Furthermore, as Professor Cramer has argued,
a tribe's pursuit of recognition often stirs up racialized, and racist,
212. See Carrillo,supra note 207, at 544.
213. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 363.
214. See id. (describing lawsuit brought by the Stillaguamish Tribe, whose acknowledgement
petition was caught up in the BIA's moratorium on decision-making while it developed a system for
federal recognition). The criteria were published in the Federal Register in 1978. Procedure for
Establishing that an American Indian Group Exits as an Indian Tribe, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,743 (June 1,
1978). The first list of federally recognized tribes was published in 1979. See Indian Tribal Entities
that Have a Government-to-Government Relationship with the United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235
(Feb. 6, 1979).
215. See 25 C.F.R. pt 83 (2012).
216. See id. § 83.7(a)-{g).
217. See generally RENtE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF
TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT (2005); MILLER, supranote 182.

1082

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1041

reactions to tribes and Indian people.2 18 The public and the media,
lacking the historical understanding of how federal policies both forced
tribes to assimilate and arbitrarily excluded tribes from federal
recognition, often assume or infer that "fake" Indians are pursuing
gaming money.219 Public reactions reflect the unique ways that tribes
have been racialized and stereotyped; the harshest accusations often
come in the form of questioning of tribal authenticity because tribal
members look either too white or too black.220
The recognition criteria themselves entangle lineage with politics.
Tribes petitioning for acknowledgment must show that they "descend
from a historical Indian tribe."221 Proof of "blood," even if only traceable
by descent, is therefore built into the legal foundation for being
recognized as a tribe in the political sense. Furthermore, this criterion
might be required by the Constitution. Indian tribes are referred to twice
in the Constitution in ways that advert to their separate political status. 222
If any other group of U.S. citizens demanded a similar status, along with
a direct government-to-government relationship with the United States,
it would be called secession.223 While "lineage" is not the same as the
socio-political construct of race, it is not at all clear that members of the
Supreme Court accept that distinction. 224 Yet if the Justices impose their
colorblind understanding of racial discrimination on lineage
requirements, they may find themselves subjecting the Constitution itself
to strict scrutiny.
There is a better way. Leave the historical origins of tribes' separate
218. See generally CRAMER, supra note 217.
219. See id. at 97-102 (describing some non-Indian reactions to tribes' pursuit of recognition).
220. See id. at 106, 124, 153.
221. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e) (2012).
222. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl. 2 (Treaty
Clause); see also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 164. The Treaty Clause does not refer in the text to
Indian tribes, but there is no serious doubt that the Treaty power was intended to extend to tribes,
and it was widely exercised as such.
223. See, e.g., Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of
South Carolina from the Federal Union, reprinted in JOHN AMASA MAY & JOAN REYNOLDS
FAUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA SECEDES 76, 76 (1960), available at http://sunsite.utk.edu/civilwar/reasons.htm. "And now the State of South Carolina having resumed her separate and equal
place among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the
nations of the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act." Id.
224. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) ("Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that
proxy here. Even if the residents of Hawaii in 1778 had been of more diverse ethnic backgrounds
and cultures, it is far from clear that a voting test favoring their descendants would not be a racebased qualification."); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) ("The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
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political existence intact. History makes distinctions based on precontact descent for this purpose the right thing, as well as the
constitutionally defensible thing. Beyond this point of origin, courts and
the federal government should allow tribes to determine their
membership criteria as they see fit, with or without blood quantum or
lineal descent.2 25 The origins of a separate political existence need not
trap American Indian tribes in time and space with respect to developing
meaningful, post-colonial understandings of themselves and their
people.
2.

Meanings andEffects of Tribal Membership

The story of how the United States arrived at a list of "federally
recognized tribes" is complicated enough, but the messy legal
classifications that apply to Native people do not end there. Different
programs and benefits depend on how membership in a federally
recognized tribe is defined. Further, sometimes benefits and programs
apply to Native people regardless of whether they are members of
federally recognized tribes, however defined.22 6
a.

BIA Employment Preferences

The BIA employment preference, the very classification at issue in
Mancari, is a fair place to start mapping the role that tribal membership
and descent play in federal Indian programs. When Mancari was
decided, the BIA employment preference applied to members of
federally recognized tribes with a quarter or more Indian blood.2 27 Three
years after Mancari was decided, the BIA modified its employment
preference criteria "to conform to the definition of 'Indian' in the IRA,
which had created the preference."22 8 The IRA definition provides:
The term "Indian" . . . shall include all persons of Indian descent

who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under
Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such
225. For a compelling proposal to tribes along these lines, see Matthew Fletcher, Tribal
Membership and Indian Nationhood, - AM. INDIAN L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2012-2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2129813 (suggesting that tribes
should, to express fully their status as sovereigns, move toward membership criteria rooted in
affiliation and territory rather than blood quantum and descent).
226. See O'Brien, supra note 91, at 1478 (describing eligibility of Native Hawaiians for certain
federal programs notwithstanding lack of federally recognized tribal status).
227. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
228. Wayne R. Farnsworth, Bureau of Indian Affairs Hiring Preferences After Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 1996 BYU L. REV. 503, 513 (1996).
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members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include
all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the
purposes of this Act, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of
Alaska shall be considered Indians.229
The BIA continues to base its hiring preference criteria on the IRA's
definition of Indian. BIA applicants have the option to fill out a form
that establishes preference based on whether the applicant: (1) is a
member of a federally-recognized tribe, band or community; (2) is a
descendant of enrolled members of federally-recognized tribes who were
residing on a reservation on June 1, 1934; (3) possesses at least one-half
degree Indian blood; or (4) is "a member of an Alaska Native Tribe; or,
an individual whose name appears on the roll of Alaska Natives prior to
July 31, 1981, and not subsequently disenrolled; or, an individual who
was issued stock in a Native corporation pursuant to 43 U.S.C.
§ 1606(g)(1)(B)(i)." 2 30 The change from Mancari allows the BIA to
apply the preference to all tribal members, rather than just tribal
members who also possess one-quarter or more Indian blood, and also to
non-tribal members who possess one-half or more Indian blood.
b.

Statutory Benefits and Services

Although the IRA itself defined "Indian" to include tribal members
and Indians with one-half blood quantum, today most federal programs
that provide services to individual Indians make eligibility contingent on
membership in a federally recognized tribe.2 3 1 The Tribally Controlled
Community College Assistance Act defines Indians as members of
federally recognized tribes.232 Similarly, Indians are defined by federally
recognized tribal membership under the BIA's Job Placement and
Training Program,233 and the Food Stamp Program.2 34
Within programs that apply tribal enrollment as the main criteria,
229. 25 U.S.C.

§479 (2006).

230. VERIFICATION OF INDIAN PREFERENCE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS AND THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, FORM BIA-4432 (expires Nov. 30, 2014), available at

http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc0I 5598.pdf.
231. See Fletcher,supranote 25, at 302.
232. See 25 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2); see also 25 C.F.R. § 41.3(h) (2012) (implementing
regulations).
233. 25 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2012).
234. 7 C.F.R. § 273.4(a)(3)(ii) (2012); see also USDA, AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA
NATIVE: A GUIDE TO USDA PROGRAMS 78-79 (2007), available at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/
supportdocuments/AmerIndianNativeAlaskGuide_07-ll-07.pdf.
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there are sometimes understandable expansions. For example, in the
Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act, the definition
of "Indian student" includes a member of a tribe, and also a "biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe, living or deceased." 2 35 The Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA),236 which imposes limits on state authority to
remove Indian children from their families, 237 defines an Indian as "any
person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native
and a member of a Regional Corporation as defined in section 7 of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1606.",238 The ICWA
defines an Indian child as "any unmarried person who is under age 18
and is either a member of an Indian tribe, or is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe." 239
The Indian Health Service (IHS) defines Indian even more broadly.
An individual is eligible for IHS treatment if she is "of Indian and/or
Alaska Native descent as evidenced by:" (1) the community regarding
her as Indian or Alaska Native; (2) her membership--"enrolled or
otherwise"-in an Indian or Alaska Native Tribe; (3) her residence on
tax-exempt land or ownership of restricted property; (4) her active
participation in tribal affairs; or (5) "any other reasonable factor
indicative of Indian descent."2 40 Indians of Canadian or Mexican origin
also qualify for IHS as long as they are considered members of an Indian
tribe that is served by IHS. 241 Non-Indian women pregnant with the child
of an eligible Indian also qualify, but only for the duration of the
pregnancy plus six weeks. 2 42 Last, non-Indians living in an Indian's
household may be eligible if they pose a threat to the public health, as
determined by the medical officer in charge.243
FederalCriminalJurisdiction

c.

Given the emphasis, for equal protection purposes, that Mancari

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
SERV.,
241.
242.
243.

See 25 U.S.C. § 1801(7)(B) (Supp. 112009).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2006).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4)-(5), 1902.
25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2012).
Id.
Indian Health Manual § 2-1.2 Persons to Whom Services May be Provided,INDIAN HEALTH
http://www.ihs.gov/ihm/index.cfm?module=dsp-ihmpc-p2c1 (last visited June 21, 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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placed on the political distinction between members of federally
recognized tribes versus non-members (whether American Indian or
not), one might expect that distinctive federal treatment for criminal
prosecution would likewise rest on enrollment in a federally recognized
tribe. But it does not. The Major Crimes Act, passed in 1885 at the dawn
of the Allotment era, subjects "Indians" to federal prosecution for listed
felonies. 2 4 The Act itself does not define "Indian." Instead, courts rely
on a definition that dates back to a case decided several decades before
the passage of the Major Crimes Act. In 1846, in United States v.
Rogers,2 4 5 the Court considered whether Rogers, a white man who had
been adopted as a Cherokee citizen, was an "Indian" under federal
statutes exempting Indian-on-Indian crimes from federal jurisdiction.246
The Court held that Rogers (and the white man whom he was accused of
murdering) could not be considered Indian because Indian tribes lacked
power to naturalize anyone not of their "race."247 The definition of
Indian that emerged, and was later grafted onto prosecutions under the
Major Crimes Act, required that the person (1) have some degree of
Indian blood, and (2) be recognized within his or her community or by
the federal government as an Indian.248
Notwithstanding the distant and racist origins of the Rogers
formulation, it persists in contemporary doctrine. When a defendant is
prosecuted either under the Major Crimes Act or the Indian Country
prosecutors and Adefense attorneys do battle over
Crimes Act (ICCA), 249an
whether the defendant (or victim) has the requisite degree of "Indian

244. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). The Major Crimes Act was part of the larger assimilative
agenda. Seizing on public dismay after the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Kang-Gi-Shun-Ca
(Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that the federal government lacked the power to
prosecute a crime committed by a tribal member against another tribal member, Congress hastily
passed a statute extending its powers of criminal prosecution to Indian defendants in Indian country.
See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 101, 134-38 (1994); Kevin K. Washburn,

American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 770 (2006); Kevin K. Washburn,
FederalCriminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 803 (2006).
245. 45 U.S. (I How.) 567 (1846).

246. Id.
247. See id. at 572-73. For an illuminating history of the case, see Bethany R. Berger, "Power
Over This Unfortunate Race ": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004).

248. See United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing two-part test
and noting that it has been adopted by other circuits); Weston Meyring, "I'm an Indian Outlaw,
Half Cherokee and Choctaw ": Criminal Jurisdictionand the Question of Indian Status, 67 MONT.
L. REv. 177, 186 (2006).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
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blood." 250 With respect to the former, courts have varied in their
conclusions about how much blood is required. 5 Some courts require
"some" Indian blood.252 Others look for a "significant" degree of Indian
blood,253 others a "substantial" degree,254 and for others still, a
"sufficient" degree will do. 2 5 5 Even courts that have adopted the same
terminology do not apply it uniformly, nor do they provide explanations
regarding why certain percentages meet, or fail to meet, the threshold. 5
The second element of defining "Indian" for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act and the Indian Country Crimes
Act-recognition as an Indian by the community or the federal
government- has a similarly confusing array of interpretations.257 Most
courts use the same language: the person must be "recognized as an
Indian by a tribe or the federal government." 25 8 Beyond this, the
consensus dwindles.259 In St. Cloud v. United States,260 the federal
250. Under the ICCA, the federal government has jurisdiction over crimes in which the defendant
is a non-Indian and the victim is Indian, and pursuant to the ICCA in combination with the
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, also over most misdemeanors involving and
Indian defendant and non-Indian victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152; COHEN, supra note 42,
§ 9.02[l][b], at 731-34 (describing ICCA and ACA jurisdiction, and noting that while courts
assume the ACA applies in Indian country, the Supreme Court has never addressed the question
directly).
251. See Meyring, supra note 248, at 190-93 (canvassing the cases concerning the degree of
blood requirement); Katharine C. Oakley, Comment, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of
FederalCriminalJurisdiction,35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 184-85 (2011).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that someone
having 3/32ds of Indian blood met the "some" requirement); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449,
455-56 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that someone with 25/64ths and someone with I1/32ds Indian
blood met the "some" requirement); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D.
1988) (holding that someone with 15/32ds of Indian blood met the "some" requirement).
253. This degree has mostly been adopted by state courts. See, e.g., State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983,
986-87 (Mont. 1990) (holding that an individual with 165/512ths of Indian blood met the
"significant" requirement); Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (holding
that a little less than 1/4th met the "significant" requirement); State v. Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 410-11
(Utah 2007) (holding that an individual with 1/16th Indian blood did not meet the "significant"
requirement).
254. See, e.g., Ex parte Pero v. Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938) (holding that someone with
3/4ths Indian blood met the "substantial" requirement); Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo.
1982) (holding that someone with 1/8th Indian blood did not meet the "substantial" requirement).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 843, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an
individual with 29/128th Indian blood met the "sufficient" requirement).
256. See Meyring, supra note 248, at 190-92; Oakley, supra note 251, at 185-87.
257. Meyring, supra note 248, at 193; Oakley, supra note 251, at 191.
258. Oakley, supra note 251, at 187 (quoting United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Torres,
733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont, 1990)).
259. Id.
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district court in South Dakota listed, "in declining order of importance,"
the following factors:
1) enrollment in a tribe;
2) government recognition formally and informally through
providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians;
3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and
4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation
and participating in Indian social life.261
Although many courts have adopted the St. Cloud factors, they vary
with respect to how they apply them.262 Most courts do not view tribal
enrollment in a federally recognized tribe as necessary.2 63 Some courts,
however, have required that the tribe that recognizes the person as a
member (whether formally enrolled or not) be federally recognized. 2 64
Other courts do not use the St. Cloud factors at all, and instead analyze
all of the facts collectively and determine the second prong on a case-bycase basis.265 Yet another approach is to assess the defendant's
recognition of his or her tribal status, rather than the tribe's acceptance
or recognition. 266
Where, in all of this parsing of blood and membership, is the language
embraced in Mancari and Antelope distinguishing political affiliation
from race? 2 6 7 Antelope did not address the "Indian by blood" portion of
the Rogers test, presumably because the criminal defendants in that case
were enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. They challenged the
Major Crimes Act distinction, and its unequal effects in their case, but

260. 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988).
261. Id. at 1461.
262. Oakley, supra note 251, at 188; see, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846-48 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant did not meet the requirement of the second prong despite
living on the reservation, going to the Indian school, and being eligible for tribal benefits); Stymiest,
581 F.3d at 766 (holding that the defendant met the requirement of the second prong by satisfying
only the third and fourth St. Cloud factors); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that the defendant met the requirement of the second prong because she lived on the
reservation, obtained Indian assistance, and was arrested under tribal authority); United States v.
Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888-89 (D.S.D. 1991), affd, 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the defendant did not have Indian status because he was not an enrolled member, had not received
assistance, and had limited affiliation with the tribe).
263. Meyring, supranote 248, at 197; Oakley, supra note 251, at 188.
264. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Meyring, supra note
248, at 221, 224.
265. Oakley, supra note 251, at 192-93.
266. See United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2005).
267. See supra Part L.A (discussing Mancari and Antelope).
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did not distinguish between the Indian political status aspects of Mancari
and the Rogers requirement of Indian blood.268
The federal criminal jurisdiction cases beg the question of how the
Rogers requirement has survived in contemporary jurisprudence. If the
federal judiciary's color-blind adherents were to begin scrutinizing
federal classifications that affect American Indians, this would be the
place to start. The "Indian by blood" criteria adds nothing but an overlay
of dated biological notions of race to the requirement that the person be
a political, social, or other kind of "member" of a federally recognized
tribe. And the varying definitions of "membership" for the purposes of
federal criminal prosecution embrace a more expansive understanding
than Mancari seemed to endorse. Cases addressing equal protection
challenges in the civil context rarely advert to this unruly body of law,
and perhaps understandably so. It leads much more readily to a
condemnation of the structure of federal criminal prosecution of Indians
than it does to judicial second-guessing of economic or social legislation
that benefits political sovereigns.
d.

Tribal CriminalJurisdiction

The question of who is a "member" of a tribe for purposes of criminal
prosecution also arises in the context of tribal criminal jurisdiction.
Tribes have inherent sovereign authority to prosecute their own
members.269 In Duro v. Reina,270 the Supreme Court held that tribes had
been "implicitly divested" of their inherent authority over Indians who
were members of other tribes (nonmember Indians).27 1 Congress, at the
urging of tribes, reversed the Duro ruling by amending the Indian Civil
Rights Act 2 72 to recognize inherent tribal authority over nonmember
Indians.273 Tribal courts can therefore prosecute Indians who are
members of their own and other tribes. While tribal courts are not bound
by the definition of "Indian" in the federal cases, including the Rogers
criteria of Indian "by blood," their decisions may be reviewed under the
268. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977) ("[T]he prosecution in this case
offered proof that respondents are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and thus not
emancipated from tribal relations. Moreover, members of tribes whose official status has been
terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.").
269. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
270. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
271. See id. at 699.
272. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2006) (amended in 2010).
273. See id.
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habeas corpus provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act and federal
courts might then employ the same tests they use to determine Major
Crimes Act jurisdiction (discussed above) to assess whether the tribal
courts have exceeded their inherent authority.274
C.

Concluding Thoughts About Recognition and Membership

For American Indian tribes, the journey from pre-contact independent
sovereigns to "federally recognized tribes" was a political one. The
colonial process of absorbing aboriginal peoples into the United States
included reformatting tribes' independent sovereign status to fit within
the domestic legal regime. The politics often included subordination
through a complicated process of assigning certain inferior
characteristics to tribes in order to justify the federal government's
unilateral imposition of authority. At the same time, the process imposed
tribal membership definitions that foreclosed the pre-colonial fluidity of
tribal identity. The racial and the political became inextricably linked as
a result, imposing on tribes a lineal-descent framework that today both
protects tribal ties to their aboriginal origins, but also renders them
vulnerable to charges of defining membership by "race," and consequent
questioning of their separate political status on equal protection grounds.
II.

LEGAL HISTORIES OF RECOGNITION, MEMBERSHIP, AND
RACE

The foregoing describes the general history of how indigenous
nations within U.S. borders became folded into the domestic legal order
and denominated "federally recognized tribes." Each of the 566 tribes
with that status also has its own unique history. The two histories
discussed below represent different aspects of the project of
transforming free and independent peoples into juridical entities subject
to U.S. law. The CRIT reservation was a spot on a map, selected by
federal agents and politicians who hoped that "if you designate it, they
will come." "They" included virtually all of the many distinct peoples
that lived near the lower Colorado River valley. The aim was to
consolidate many peoples into one geo-political unit for the purpose of
clearing the land and facilitating control. By contrast, the Great Dakota
Nation, comprised of bands and sub-groups with common origins and

274. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming tribal court conviction
from equal protection challenge under habeas provisions of the ICRA), analyzed infra at notes 52028.
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language, occupied a vast territory that initially seemed unimportant to
the U.S. and, therefore, acceptable to concede to the Indians. As U.S.
interest in the territory grew for a variety of economic and ideological
reasons, the affiliated peoples of the Great Dakota Nation were dispersed
and divided into many different federally recognized tribes. While these
are only two of the many hundreds of stories that could be told, they
echo and reinforce the larger narrative of the politics and law inherent in
constructing federally recognized tribes.
A.

The Colorado River Indian Tribes

The CRIT's reservation straddles the Arizona-California border as
well as the Colorado River. Mohave and Chemehuevi people, who
historically were adversaries, have occupied the CRIT reservation since
1865, when it was established for "Indians of [the Colorado River] and
its tributaries."2 75 In 1945, the federal government persuaded the CRIT
government to accept Navajo and Hopi tribal members onto the
reservation, and a short-lived relocation program resulted in a small
influx of Navajo and Hopi people who relinquished their political
affiliations with those tribes and became members of the CRIT.
According to CRIT tribal member Michael Tsosie:
The reason that [Chemehuevi, Navajo and Hopi] were placed on
the reservation was that the Federal government decided that
Mohaves had too much land and not enough people, and the
other tribes, had too many people and not enough
land..

.

. Unfortunately this situation has created more problems

than it ever resolved for the tribes involved.276
Tsosie describes his own tribal identity in the following way:
"[R]acially I am identified by others as Native American, racially I am
identified by other Native Americans as Mohave, Navajo, and Laguna,
politically I am identified as a member of the Colorado River Indian
Tribes, socially and culturally I am a Mohave."277
Tsosie's succinct summary of his own identity is a fitting synecdoche
for the CRIT's situation as a whole. Several distinct ethnic, linguistic,
and political groups were ushered onto a single reservation and
identified as a single tribe, not because it was consistent with their own
cultures or priorities, but because it was expedient for the federal
275. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 541, 559.
276. MICHAEL TSOSIE, PRESERVATION OF MOHAVE HISTORY AND CULTURE 1 (Dec. 1993),

availableat http://www.cric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED379115.pdf.
277. Id. at 2.
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government. Further, the history of the CRIT, while singular in many
respects, nonetheless reflects the general process by which independent
aboriginal peoples became today's federally recognized American
Indian tribes, and how the racial and the political are hopelessly
entangled by that process.
1.

Establishingthe CRIT Reservation: For Whom and How Many?

Historically, many tribes occupied and used the Colorado River
Valley between Yuma and Fort Mohave, including the Mohave,
Chemehuevi, Yuma, Yavapai, and Hualapai. In the mid-1800s, interest
grew, due to non-Indian settlement and desire for land and access to the
River, in addressing Indian land claims, settling the many tribes in one
place, and quieting the frontier.278 The CRIT reservation was established
by an Act of Congress in 1865, with no mention of negotiations with the
many tribes in the region nor even a single name of any tribe that had
agreed to settle there. The full text of the statute, which was embedded
in a long list of other provisions affecting Indian affairs, reads:
All that part of the public domain in the Territory of Arizona,
lying west of a direct line from Half-Way Bend to Corner Rock
on the Colorado River, containing about seventy-five thousand
acres of land, shall be set apart for an Indian reservation for the
Indians of said river and its tributaries.279
The intent was to recognize several different tribes' aboriginal claims
to the territory, but also to concentrate the many Indian peoples who
lived on or near the Colorado River into a single place in order to
alleviate conflict with whites. The report of Charles D. Poston, the first
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona, makes both of these aims
clear:
It is proposed to colonize some ten thousand Indians
within . . . [the proposed reservation site's] boundaries..

.

. By a

fiction of law, founded on neither reason nor justice, the Indian
title is ignored in all the territory acquired from Mexico, because
the Spanish Conquerors and Mexicans did them this injustice. It
is difficult for the Indians to understand this sophistry, and the
absurdity of the action under it needs no argument....
The rapid influx of population in this region renders it
necessary that some provision should be made for the original
278. Charles D. Poston, Arizona Superintendency: No. 53, in REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS FOR THE YEAR 1864, at 150,157 (1865).
279. 13 Stat. at 559.
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inhabitants. The plan of establishing them on a reservation, and
providing them the great desideratum of water to aid their
cultivation, will no doubt meet your approval....
Difficulties are already growing up between the Indians and
whites in that vicinity on account of the occupation of the Indian
land, and unless prompt action is taken to regulate differences,
by providing the Indians a home, the consequences will be
painful.2 80
The absence of any negotiation process, such as would have occurred
prior to a treaty, meant that no tribes, not even the Mohave who had
inhabited the majority of the area designated as the reservation, had
promised to go or stay there. Not surprisingly, the years following the
CRIT reservation's establishment were, therefore, ones of uncertainty
with respect to which tribes would actually make it home, let alone
concede to giving up their broader territorial claims.28 1 In September
1865, Mohaves, Yumas, and Yavapai engaged in skirmishes with the
Chemehuevi and the Pintahs for claims to the reservation. 2 82 The
Mohave and their allies were determined to drive the Chemehuevi from
the area, even though the Mohave and Chemehuevi were the only yearround residents of the reservation at that time.283 When the fighting
ended in 1867, an estimated 750 Mohave occupied the reservation.284
Initially, some Yavapai also settled at the CRIT reservation.2 85
According to an annual report, 2000 "Yavapais or Apache-Mohaves"
were living on the reservation in 1868.286 Nonetheless, in the same 1868
report, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles E. Mix admitted
that:
The Colorado river reservation has not so far been very
successful, yet it is believed, with additional aid from Congress,
it can be made a suitable home for many of the tribes. It will not
do, however, to withdraw the Indians from their hunting grounds
unless adequate provision is made for them on the reservation.2 87
Despite hopes that more tribes and greater numbers of Indian people
280. Poston, supra note 278, at 157.
281. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supranote 2, at 8-11.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 14-15.

287. Charles E. Mix, Annual Report on Indian Affairs by the Acting Commissioner,in REPORT ON
INDIAN AFFAIRS, BY THE ACTING COMMISSIONER, FOR THE YEAR 1867, at 1, 10 (1868).
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would settle at the CRIT reservation, initially only the Mohave and a
much smaller number of Chemehuevi could be induced to stay. The
other tribes who had been targeted for the CRIT reservation, including
some Mohave, established their own reservations in the region between
1876 and 1917.288 As a result, the CRIT reservation remained much
more sparsely populated than the government had planned. Instead of
Poston's aspiration of 10,000, the number, largely composed of Mohave,
reached barely over 800. Among the many reasons for the low numbers
was the recurring failure to deliver irrigation water to the reservation.
Repeatedly, the Indian agents expressed optimism that if the canal and
irrigation infrastructure were completed, more Indians could be induced
to stay and farm. Yet, appropriations to complete the project were
perennially insufficient. 2 89 To keep the Indians within the reservation
boundaries, the Indian agents alternated between pleading for more
provisions and demanding troops to "keep the Indians intimidated." 2 90
As late as 1890, after the Pima and Maricopa, Tohono O'odham (then
Papago), Yuma, Hualapai, Navajo, Havasupai, and Hopi had their own
reservations recognized, the Indian agent for the region, George Allen,
remained optimistic that more Indians would move to CRIT if the
irrigation infrastructure were completed:
[T]here is no reason in the world why the present state of affairs
should continue on this reservation. With the expenditure of a
few thousand dollars in a 6-horse-power boiler and two vacuum
irrigating pumps, a perpetual supply of water can be had (the
ditch already being constructed), and all the Mohaves,
Hualapais, and Chimehuevi [sic] made self-sustaining. Besides
there is land enough to support the Yumas, the ApacheMohaves, and Apache-Yumas. 2 9'
288. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 21-22.

289. See id at 15 ("The most important news was the beginning of the canal. . . . On December
16th the canal was started with the Indian as willing laborers. Five miles of the canal had been
completed, but, because of funds running out, the work had stopped."); id. at 16 ("During the year
the head-gate of the canal had been completed. . . . Very little needed to be done to complete the
work, and admit water from the Colorado River. The Indians were very excited at the prospect.");
id. at 17 ("A continual optimism was expressed during these early years that as soon as the canal
was completed the many problems connected with the Indians od western Arizona would be
resolved."); id. ("There was no overflow of the river and the canal was not completed in time."); id.
("Because [the Indian agent] didn't feel that the limited amount of money at his command would do
any real good, he didn't spend any at all for the canal.").
290. Id. at 18.
291. Id. at 21 (quoting George Allen, Report of Colorado River Agency, in 59TH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 1, 4

(1890)).
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Allen's optimism proved unwarranted. The CRIT reservation
remained home only to Mohave and Chemehuevi people, and not even
all of their numbers. Nonetheless, over the years the CRIT boundaries
expanded. River bottom-lands were added by executive order in
292
November 1873, and the reservation was again enlarged in 1874.
Other alterations over the years included boundary adjustments and sales
to railroad companies. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
CRIT reservation comprised over 265,000 acres.29 3
The next attempt to make CRIT into a more efficient and densely
populated farming community came during the Allotment era. CRIT
294
In
allotment was intimately tied to the era's reclamation policies.
1902, the Reclamation Act295 authorized federally subsidized water
storage projects throughout the West. The aim was to provide western
agricultural interests with predictable irrigation flows. 2 96 Reclamation's
primary intended beneficiaries were non-Indians, and the CRIT
allotment statutes reflected that larger goal. Allotment and reclamation
would finally deliver on the promise of irrigation for CRIT, but any
unalloted lands would be opened to non-Indian settlement:297
[T]he Indians were expected to accept increased allotment sizes
and a government irrigation project to water their holdings, and
to pay for this irrigation project with funds derived by the tribe
for sale of lands they would have to sell under the provisions of
the Reclamation Act. Moreover, the Act of March 3, 1911 [,
provided that should the allottee receive patent in fee simple, his
outstanding debt for his share of the irrigation cost would be a
first lien on the patent.298
The intent, in other words, was to divide up the CRIT reservation and
provide long-promised irrigation, but also to charge the CRIT tribal
members for that service and collect the fees by forcing the sale of
unallotted lands and placing liens on the property of any tribal members
who received fee patents for their allotments. To fully appreciate the
near-diabolical nature of these schemes, it is important to recall that no
292. See id. at 22.
293. Id at 23.
294. See id. at 23.
295. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. from
§ 371 to § 498).
296. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 246-47 (1992) (describing the
Reclamation Act of 1902 and associated policies).
297. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 23-24.
298. Id.
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tribes ever negotiated to accept the CRIT reservation and its long-

promised "improvements" in exchange for their much larger aboriginal
land claims. 2 9 9 The bargain, or lack of one, was of the following nature:
stay here, or else you will stay here with even less.
For reasons that are not entirely clear from the historical record, the
Secretary of the Interior never did exercise his authority under the CRIT
allotment acts to open CRIT lands to non-Indian settlement. 300 Yet
Arizona refused to give up on the idea. The Second Arizona Legislature
asked Congress "to take the necessary steps to open the reservation's
100,000 to 125,000 acres of irrigable land to entry." 0 1 In 1916, the
Senate Indian Affairs Committee held hearings on the Indian
Appropriation Bill and considered Arizona's request, which asserted the
following:
That the town site of Parker is a barren desert, on land having an
intrinsic value of less than $1 per acre. That whatever added
value it may have arises from the fact that it is adjacent to the
bottom lands of the Colorado River Indian Reservation, in which
the surplus lands above referred to lie; and unless said lands are
opened to settlement and entry the town site of Parker is worth
little, or not more than any other desert land.

... That the residents of Parker and numerous other residents of
the State of Arizona interested therein, who were induced to
purchase lots in the Parker town site by reason of the implied
promise of the United States above set forth to open the
reservation lands to entry, have repeatedly petitioned Congress
and the Department of the Interior for the opening of the surplus
lands.
... That the surplus Indian lands described above are highly

desirable as prospective farms, and hundreds of energetic and
enterprising citizens of this State alone are awaiting the
opportunity to secure tracts of lands for the purpose of making
their homes thereon. That to the best knowledge and belief of
299. See Kenneth M. Stewart, The Aboriginal Territory of the Mohave Indians, 16
ETHNOHISTORY 257, 263 (1969) (discussing how following its establishment in 1865, some
Mohave Indians were "persuaded" to move onto the Colorado River Reservation while others
"refused to move from their ancestral homeland in the Mohave Valley"); see also Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) (asserting that Indians were "put" on the Colorado River
reservation, which was "not considered ... the most desirable area of the Nation"), judgment
entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 268 (1966) and 446 U.S. 144 (1984).
300. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 24.

301. See id.
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your memorialists a large amount of the delay in opening the
surplus lands of said reservation to settlement in accordance
with the said implied promise of the United States has been
caused by unnecessary entanglements of official red tape in the
various bureaus at Washington having charge of reclamation
work and Indian affairs.302
Despite Arizona's pleas, which relied on the expectations of nonIndian real estate speculators, Congress did not open the CRIT lands for
settlement.303 The federal government seemed poised to relent on trying
to settle Indians other than the Mohave and Chemehuevi members of
CRIT on the reservation. The concession did not last long. Soon,
relocation of Navajo and Hopi people became the focus of the
government's plans to redeem CRIT's apparently intolerably sparse
population.
2.

Battles over CRIT Membership

In 1933, the Indian Service embarked on a new effort to increase the
population of the CRIT reservation by reaching out to tribal members on
other reservations. First, Superintendent C.H. Gensler focused on
recruiting from the Tohono O'odham (Papago) Reservation. 304 Next, he
turned hopefully to the cause of bringing Navajo tribal members to
CRIT.30 s Gensler's campaign met with receptive ears in Washington. In
1934, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier "sent a letter to all
the reservation superintendents in Arizona calling their attention to the
'lands of the Colorado River Indian Reservation."' He instructed,
"'make a careful canvas or check of your jurisdiction, ascertain the
views of the Indians you believe might or should be interested and report
the results to this office.", 3 06 The Indian Service's settlement goals were,
again, linked to their efforts to finalize irrigation projects. With only 700
Mohave and Chemehuevi settled at CRIT in 1935, the Director of
Irrigation for the Indian Office testified before a Senate Committee that
the plans were to "bring in other Indians" in order to justify his request
for funding to irrigate 100,000 acres at CRIT.307
302. Indian Appropriation Bill: Hearing on H.R. 10385 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
64th Cong. 186 (1916) (emphasis added) (statement of Henry F. Ashurst, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, quoting memorial from the Second Legislature of the State of Arizona).
303. See id. at 25.
304. See id. at 40.
305. See id.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 41.
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Parallel to the Indian Service's colonization effort, CRIT was working
to establish an approved tribal constitution under the IRA. 0 This led the
Indian Service to intensify its analysis of the exact nature of the legal
rights the enrolled CRIT members had to the CRIT reservation. The BIA
used this moment to further pressure the Tribe to allow for
"colonization," urging them to include a provision in the tribal
constitution that would allow the federal government to settle other
tribes on the CRIT reservation. The BIA maintained the position that the
1865 Act establishing the Reservation for "Indians of [the Colorado
River] and its tributaries" meant that the Mohave and Chemehuevi did
not have exclusive rights to the land. The Indian Service clung to this
view, notwithstanding three contrary opinions by U.S. Solicitor Nathan
Margold, the last of which was quite definitive: "The Secretary of the
Interior has no right to locate other Indians on this reservation without
the consent of the tribes having jurisdiction over the reservation, and the
Indians have a clear legal right to withhold their consent." 09 The
Solicitor further warned that "it would be inconsistent with the intent of
section 16" of the IRA to compel CRIT to surrender exclusive rights to
the reservation by refusing to approve their proposed constitution. 3 10
Based on the Solicitor's opinions, in 1937 the Acting Secretary of the
Interior approved the CRIT constitution, which maintained that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the Colorado River Indian Tribes shall include all the
territory within the original confines of the Colorado River Indian
Reservation," and vested membership in all persons of Indian blood who
appeared on the official census roll of the reservation as of January 1,
1937, as well as offspring of one-half or more Indian blood born to nonresident members of the Tribes.31 1 The Constitution also gave the tribe
the power by popular referendum to promulgate ordinances regarding
new membership requirements and resulting property rights.3 12
Despite the adopted constitution, the Indian Service continued to
stress to the CRIT that once the new government-funded irrigation
project was in place, there would be 100,000 acres of irrigable land on
the reservation, more than the existing CRIT members could farm.

308. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (describing IRA period).
309. Nathan Margold, Colorado River Indian Tribes of Colorado River Reservation-Surrender
ofRights ofExclusive Occupancy (Oct. 29, 1936), in OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 188,
at 697, 697.
310. See id.
311. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF THE COLORADO

RIVER RESERVATION, Aug. 13, 1937, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/colcons.html.
312. See id
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Federal officials warned that the white community was already
pressuring the government for access to reservation lands.
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier was reported to say in a
meeting with CRIT on September 20, 1939:
What is the nature of your title, if any, to this great area? I think
the answer is that nobody quite knows .... However, the real
and the practically controlling fact is, the 100,000 acres are
going to be irrigated, and you ... cannot use all of it.
Impossible! It will be used either by Indians or white people. If
used by white people, it will soon be owned by white people.
From your standpoint and that of Indians as a whole, it is better
that Indians be located here. 313
At the time there were about 875 Mohaves and 312 Chemehuevis on
the reservation. It is important to recall that Commissioner Collier's
Solicitor, Nathan Margold, had answered the very question Collier posed
about the nature of CRIT title, and Margold's answer was wholly
supportive of the Mohave and Chemehuevi's position. Collier's notable
omission of Margold's answer, and the substitution of Collier's own
wistful statement that "nobody quite knows" is curious to say the least.
Consistent with Collier's position, the BIA continued for the next five
years to cajole the tribe to agree to colonization, even overtly threatening
that if Congress got involved, the land was likely to go to white
community members.3 15 A BIA memo dated November 15, 1940,
summarized the BIA position:
The Mojaves and Chemehuevis cannot possibly utilize this vast
natural resource properly. Careful study of the needs of these
Indians including those now residing at Needles and Ft. Mojave,
has led to the conclusion that their present and ultimate land
requirements will aggregate but not exceed 25,000 acres of
irrigated land. This leaves a balance or surplus of 75,000 acres,
which, if not utilized by the Indians, may be disposed of to nonIndians at the express direction of Congress, or the appurtenant
and extremely valuable water rights without which the land is

313. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 46 (emphasis

added).
314. Id. at 47.
315. Id. at 48 ("On January 19, 1943, Superintendent Gensler wrote a letter to Dr. S.D. Aberle. In
it he mentions the proposed division of the reservation for colonization purposes; the need of
working slowly with the Tribal Council, and to convince them that 'Congress will take it away from
them and give it to whites probably before they will agree to other Indians taking it."') (emphasis
added).
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practically useless, be lost.316
In addition to threatening congressional action, federal officials
predicted that if the Tribe pursued a case in the Court of Claims (based
on Solicitor Margold's memos and other sources indicating that the
Mohave and Chemehuevi had exclusive rights to the CRIT reservation
absent their consent otherwise), the government's off-sets for
improvements and irrigation systems to date, plus any future
expenditures to render the irrigation functional on the reservation, would
be more than the value of the land taken:
In view of this right to go to court if you are not satisfied, let us
look at this matter in a practical and common sense
way.

. ..

[T]here would be an accounting for everything the

Government has expended for your benefit since the reservation
was established in 1865, and the total of these expenditures
would be an offset against the value of the land taken away from
you. From a careful study of expenditures already made and a
conservative estimate of expenditures still necessary to be made
in order to construct a gravity system to deliver water to your
lands, it is evident that even if such an accounting were made,
the balance would be found to be in favor of the Government."
To summarize, throughout this period, the BIA threatened, coerced,
and otherwise urged the CRIT leadership to allow other Indians to settle
on the CRIT reservation. 1 Moreover, despite prior notions that "tribes"
were composed of individuals from the same or common lineage, 1 in
the CRIT's case the government's goal of consolidating all Indians
together in a single space overrode the distinctions among different
ethnic and linguistic groups. The racialization of CRIT was more of a
binary-Indians (any of them) on one side, and whites on the other. The
BIA Commissioner John Collier, whose highest charge was
safeguarding tribal interests, instead played the age-old role of stern
paternalist, warning CRIT that they had better accept more Indians to
stave off what would otherwise be unstoppable: white settlement and
divestment of the tribal land base.320 Collier did so even in the face of

316. Id. at 55 (quoting Statement, A Program from the Utilization of the Colorado River Indian
Reservation, Bureau of Indian Affairs (Nov. 15, 1940)).
317. Id. at 47 (quoting Remarks of H.W. Shipe, Special Assistant to the Dir. of Irrigation for the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, addressed to the Colorado River Tribal Council (Dec. 23, 1940)).
318. See Bernard L. Fontana, The Hopi-Navajo Colony on the Lower ColoradoRiver: A Problem
in EthnohistoricalInterpretation,10 ETHNOHISTORY 162, 169-73 (1963).
319. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing judicial definitions of Indian tribe).
320. See supra text accompanying note 313.
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memos from his Solicitor indicating that the federal government would
be violating the Mohave and Chemehuevi's rights under the 1865 statute
if they forced them to accept other Indians onto the CRIT reservation. 32 1
3.

OrdinanceNumber Five

On February 8, 1945, the Colorado River Tribal Council finally gave
in to relentless pressure from the BIA and passed Ordinance No. Five
("Ordinance Five"), agreeing to open tribal membership and reservation
lands to other Indians. 3 22 The Assistant Secretary of the Interior hastily
approved the Ordinance on March 9, 1945.323 Ordinance Five divided
the CRIT reservation into two parts-a Northern Reserve of about
25,000 irrigable acres that belonged exclusively to currently enrolled
members of CRIT, and a Southern Reserve of about 75,000 irrigable
acres that would be colonized by other tribes of the Colorado River
drainage including Hualapai, Hopi, Apache, Zuni, Papago, Havasupai,
Yuma, and any other approved tribes. 324 To receive land in the Southern
Reserve the "colonists," as they were called without irony, would have
to become members of the CRIT. 3 25 The colonists could apply for tribal
membership after one year of residence on the reservation, and the CRIT
had to accept their applications unless there was cause not to.326 In
exchange, the government agreed to provide irrigation for an additional
15,000 acres of tribal land in the Northern Reserve.327
Once Ordinance Five was passed, the BIA acted quickly. In 1948,
thirty-two colonist families were moved on to the reservation. 328 Still,
the relocation effort was hardly a big success. By May 17, 1949, only
twenty-nine Hopi families and fourteen Navajo families had relocated to
CRIT. This was due in part to the relatively slow pace of congressional
appropriations for the relocation effort. Despite the many years of
federal coercion leading up to the plan to move more Indians onto CRIT,
Congress had not appropriated large sums of money to develop the land
proposed for the colonists until 1948. By 1950, Congress had
appropriated $5.75 million for the relocation and resettlement of Navajo

321. See supratext accompanying notes 309-10 (discussing the Margold memos).
322. HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supranote 2, at 36.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 49.
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and Hopi Indians on the Reservation, resulting in sixty-two more people
willing to move.32 9 In a disturbing twist, the Navajo and Hopi families
who relocated were initially housed in the former Japanese-American
internment camp at Poston while awaiting their new homes on the CRIT
reservation.3 30 Collier had initially hoped to convert the barracks into
Indian housing after the Japanese left, but the buildings were torn down
before he had the chance. 3 Whether Collier and his department
intended it or not, the use of the former internment barracks heightens
the sense that certain communities were fungible, if not disposable, in
the government's eyes.
Meanwhile, tribal resistance to the Ordinance was growing. By 1949,
the CRIT Tribal Council was "dead set" against it. 3 32 In 1951, the
Council attempted to rescind Ordinance Five, but the Secretary of the
Interior refused to accept the rescission.333 Finally, in 1952, pursuant to
Article IX of the Tribal Constitution, the Ordinance was put to popular
referendum and rejected by the tribal membership.33 4 That put an end to
colonization. CRIT membership, however, was already affected. The
Navajo and Hopi families who relocated shortly after Ordinance Five
(and decided to stay) 33 5 eventually became tribal members at CRIT. By
1966, CRIT had embraced its mixed membership and a seal was created
to honor and memorialize the four tribes that constitute its
membership.336
4.

CRIT Today

Today, there are more than 3700 enrolled members of the CRIT,33
approximately 2500 of whom live on the CRIT reservation. CRIT's total
population, including non-Indian residents, is 7151 .33' The CRIT tribal
329. Id. at 54.
330. See TRUDY GRIFFIN-PIERCE, NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE SOUTHWEST 251 (2000); see also
HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 35-36.
331. ALISON R. BERNSTEIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD WAR II: TOWARD A NEW ERA IN
INDIAN AFFAIRS 85 (1999).
332. HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 50.

333. Id. at 51.
334. Id.
335. See Fontana,supra note 318, at 176-77.
336. See GRIFFIN-PIERCE,supra note 330, at 250.
337. Enrollment, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, http://www.crit-nsn.gov/critenrollment/ (last
visited July 2, 2012).
338. See Colorado River Indian Tribes Primary Care Area StatisticalProfile 2011, ARIZ. DEP'T
HEALTH SERVS. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.azdhs.gov/hsd/profiles/l2404.pdf (data gathered from
the Arizona Department of Commerce and 2010 U.S. Census indicating that the total population of
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government is headed by its nine-member Tribal Council, 339 and has
thirty-six departments, including an attorney general's office, tribal
police, and tribal utilities. 340 Economic activity at CRIT includes
agriculture, gaming, recreation, tourism, and some industrial and service
activities.34 1
CRIT's water rights, along with those of four other lower Colorado
River tribes, were decreed in Arizona v. California.34 2 CRIT therefore
has senior water rights to 719,248 acre-feet of water (or the amount
necessary to irrigate 11,694 acres, whichever is less), which comprises
roughly one-third of Arizona's allotment under the Colorado River
Compact.3 43 With established water rights and irrigation systems, a total
of 84,500 acres are under agricultural cultivation on the CRIT
reservation. 3 44 CRIT has also invested in a model riparian restoration
project along the banks of the Colorado.345
In short, despite the history of pressure, coercion, and outright
manipulation by the federal government to try to expand the CRIT
population or, in the alternative, shrink its land base, CRIT employed its
legal sovereignty as a federally recognized tribe, including associated
reserved rights to water, to create a vital and evolving homeland for its
multi-ethnic membership. Still, the imposition of a tribal identity that
was not organic to the Mohave, Chemehuevi, Navajo, or Hopi remains a
source of difficulty. 34 6 Conflicts arise for which there are no shared
cultural norms, and intra-tribal clashes ensue.347 This is part of the
legacy of the government's project of consolidation, though fortunately
the CRIT is 7151 and that 35.2% of the reservation residents are American Indian).
339. CRIT Tribal Council and Administration, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, http://www.critnsn.gov/critscontents/govemment/ (last visited July 2, 2012).
340. CRIT Tribal Departments, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, http://www.crit-nsn.gov/crit
contents/departments/ (last visited July 2, 2012).
341. See id.
342. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963),judgment entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 268
(1966) and 446 U.S. 144 (1984) (recognizing water rights for the Chemehuevi, Cocopah, CRIT,
Fort Mohave, and Quechan (Fort Yuma) tribes).
343. NoRRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 335-36 n.65 (2009).

344. Colorado River Indian Reservation Community Profile, ARIZ. DEP'T COM., (Sept. 2009),
availableat http://old.azcommerce.com/doclib/COMMUNE/colorado%20river.pdf.
345. See LINDA S. MASTERS & SABRINA TUTTLE, THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES

available at
(2008),
PROGRAMS
EXTENSION
AND
RESERVATION
(C.R.I.T.)
http://cals.arizona.edu/pubs/natresources/azl461.pdf.
346. See TSOSIE, supra note 276, at 1-2 (describing legacy of identity problems that flow from
the government's consolidation of the tribes on the CRIT reservation).
347. See generally TSoSIE, supra note 276.
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for CRIT and its people, the ultimate goal of elimination was never
achieved.
The Great Dakota Nation (Sioux People ofNorth America)

B.

Consolidation was the overriding effect of U.S. policies on CRIT; the
contrasting effects on the Sioux people were scattering and
concentrating. The Sioux, a large group of affiliated peoples, albeit with
distinct expressions of language and culture, were separated into many
federally recognized tribes on islands of land much smaller than their
aboriginal (and prior treaty) lands. As a result, contemporary Sioux
identity comprises a mosaic of affiliations that include language, history,
and geography as well as membership in one of more than sixteen
federally recognized tribes located in four states. 34 8 None of these
individual levels of identity are likely adequate to capture the full
meaning of "Sioux-ness." 349 In fact, certain affiliations might be in
tension with one another, as in the case of the majority of tribes that are
associated primarily with one or two bands or sub-bands, but also
include Sioux from other bands and even other divisions.o Figure 1
illustrates the layers of identity for the contemporary Sioux tribes of
North and South Dakota:
Figure 1 - Sioux Affiliations
Dakota Nation (OCeti Sakawin)
Santee (Eastern)

Yankton (Middle or

Teton (Western)

Wiciyela)

Dakota dialect

Nakota dialect

Lakota dialect

(Council Fires - bands:)

(Council Fires - bands:)

(Council Fires - bands:)

Mdewakanton
Sisseton
Wahpekute

Yankton
Yanktonai

Teton (Titunwan)

Wahpeton

See GIBBON, supra note 4, at 199; MICHAEL JOHNSON, TRIBES OF THE Sioux NATION 9
(listing contemporary Sioux tribes and their respective reservations and reserves in the
States and Canada).
See, e.g., Robert E. Daniels, CulturalIdentities Among the Oglala Sioux, in THE MODERN
SIoux: SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND RESERVATION CULTURE 198, 217 (Ethel Nurge ed., 1970).
350. See infra text accompanying notes 464-68 (describing movement among tribes by tribal
members); see also Sarah Krakoff, The Last Indian Raid in Kansas: Context, Colonialism, and
Philip P. Frickey's Contributions to American Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1253, 1275-77
(2010) (describing Northern Cheyenne tribal members who fled to Sioux Reservations and became
tribal members whose descendants are there to this day).
348.
(2001)
United
349.
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Teton Sub-tribes/subbands"'
Miniconjou, Sincanju,
Oglala, Hunkpapa,
Itizipco, Sihasapa,
Ohenumpa

Associated

Associated
Tribe/Reservation352

Tribe/Reservation353

Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate /
Lake Traverse

Yankton Reservation
Standing Rock

Spirit Lake
Flandreau Colony
Crow Creek

Crow Creek

Associated
Tribe/Reservation

354

Oglala Sioux
Rosebud Sioux
Standing Rock
Lower Brule
Cheyenne River

Before the creation of reservations and individual tribes, the Great
Dakota Nation was not a nation-state in our modern concept of the
phrase, but rather an alliance of entities with shared history and
language.355 The Nation was organized into three sub-groups, the Santee,
Teton, and Yankton, and beneath each were bands (Yankton, Teton) or
clans (Santee). The bands were composed of extended family groupings
(Tiyospayes), which governed themselves independently despite being
affiliated with the bands or clans for various functions. 5 Anthropologist
Guy Gibbon summarizes: "Today, ties among the Sioux remain strong,
even though they are divided by attitudes, tribal politics, and territory,"
and "it is difficult to distinguish one group of Sioux from
persist." 3 57
differences
dialectical
some
another . .. although
Nonetheless, the Sioux collective identity has diminished, and, Gibbon
concludes, "Since most tribes are scattered through different,
occasionally multi-tribal, reservations and in towns and cities, their
integrity as a distinctive people has gradually faded." 5 8

351. Lakota Winter Counts: Social Structure, SMITHSONIAN NAT'L MUSEUM NAT. HIST.,
http://wintercounts.si.edu/html_version/html/socialstructure.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
352. Nine
Tribes
in
South
Dakota, S.D.
OFF.
TRIBAL
Gov'T
REL.,
http://www.sdtribalrelations.com/ninetribes.aspx (last visited June 29, 2012).
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Id.
See GIBBON, supra note 4, at 213.
SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 11.
GIBBON, supranote 4, at 198, 199.
Id. at 199.
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How these numerous and interconnected peoples, whose aboriginal
territory stretched across vast plains and mountains, became distinct
federally recognized tribes, separated onto jurisdictional islands of
Indian country, is a story characterized by violent conflict, legal
wrangling, and accommodation to the relentless forces of non-Indian
settlement. To some extent, a bare narrative timeline (and accompanying
map) of U.S. treaties with the Sioux tells the story.
In 1851, the United States entered into treaties with the "Sioux or
Dahcotahs" and other tribes in order to settle questions about non-Indian
passage through the territory. 359 The Sioux's territory was clearly
defined and included western South Dakota, northwestern North Dakota,
a chunk of Wyoming, and bits of Montana, as well as northeastern
Nebraska. 6 o Seventeen years later, the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868361
put an end to the Plains wars between the Sioux tribes and the U.S. and
established new boundaries for the Great Sioux Nation that were more
confined than those in 185 1.362 The discovery of gold in the Black Hills
as well as persistent pressure from railroads and other constituencies to
settle non-Indians in the territories eventually led to the disintegration of
the 1868 boundaries. After more than two decades of recurring pressure,
both legal and military, the Sioux that had not already retreated to
smaller reservations signed an 1889 agreement that broke up the Great
Sioux Reservation, created six smaller reservations, and put an end to
the military battles, though not to the legal ones.363 By the end of the
nineteenth century, with Allotment and Assimilation policies in full
swing, the scattering and concentrating of the Great Dakota Nation had
been accomplished. The Sections below chronicle the story of scattering
and concentrating in greater detail.

359. See Treaty of Ft. Laramie with Sioux, etc., U.S.-Sioux or Dahcotah, Cheyenne, Arrapahoe,
Crow, Assiniboine, Gros-Ventre Mandan, and Arrickara Nations, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749.
360. See id. art. V (describing the boundaries of the "Sioux or Dahcotah Nation").
361. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, U.S.-Sioux Nations, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.
362. See id. art. 11,Xi, XVI. The 1868 Treaty also included extensive reservations of unceded
lands and hunting grounds. See id.
363. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, chs. 404, 405, 25 Stat. 888. For information on the ongoing legal
battles, see JEFFREY OSTLER, THE LAKOTAS AND THE BLACK HILLS: THE STRUGGLE FOR SACRED

GROUND 139-66 (2010).
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a.

Early Dakota Nation, 1500-1800
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In aboriginal times the Sioux shared the same language, which
evolved into the three dialects of Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota as the
bands expanded their territories and migrated.3 65 Dakota/Nakota/Lakota
means "those who consider themselves kindred," describing the
collective identity of the Sioux. 36 6 Europeans made contact with the
Sioux in the 1500s, by which time the separate Dakota dialects and
cultural differences between divisions were firmly established. 6 7 During
the 1500s and early 1600s the Dakota lived on the eastern seaboard near
the Lumber and Santee rivers of modem-day North Carolina, and near
the Ohio and Arkansas rivers in modem-day Ohio and Indiana.
The Dakota began their westward migration in the 1600s due to
increased pressure from European settlement.36 9 In the early 1600s the
Dakota resided largely in the area now known as north-central
Minnesota and the northwestern corner of Wisconsin. 37 0 The various
bands lived a relatively sedentary river-based lifestyle, practicing some
agricultural cultivation, as well as hunting and fishing.37' In the 1700s,
population pressure from both Europeans and other tribes forced the
Dakota further westward: the Teton settled in the Lake Traverse area, the
Santee settled in the Mille Lacs area of central Minnesota, and the
Yankton settled in southern Minnesota.372 By 1803, at the time of the
Louisiana Purchase, the Sioux were widely "distributed across the
prairie from Mississippi Valley . .. to just across the Missouri River in
the Dakotas." 373 They were "more numerous, powerful, and widespread

364. For a map outlining the historical and current boundaries of the Sioux reservation see
Kmusser (username), Sioux Reservation Map, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Siouxreservationmap.png (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
365. Lakota Winter Counts: Who are the Lakota, SMITHSONIAN NAT'L MUSEUM NAT. HIST.,

http://wintercounts.si.edu/html_version/html/whoare.html (last visited June 7, 2012).
366. Dakota, SASKATCHEWAN INDIAN CULTURAL CENTER, http://www.sicc.sk.caldakota use_
existing..our_1anguages-sections.html (last visited July 3, 2012).
367.
368.
369.
370.

PALMER, supranote 4, at 41.
SATTERLEE & MALAN, supranote 6, at 10.
Id.
See id.; see also Lakota Winter Counts: Who Are The Lakota, supra note 365.

371. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supranote 6, at 10.
372. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supranote 6, at 12.
373. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 76.
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than they had ever been." 374
b.

The Sioux Westward Migration,Early Reservation Era, and
Dismantlingof the GreatSioux Nation, 1800-1900

Under growing pressure from eastern tribes and white settlers, in the
early 1800s the Dakota divisions began to disperse even further
westward, beginning a process whereby the Western Sioux (Lakota)
came to look more like Plains nomads, the Eastern Sioux (Santee)
retained a woodland lifestyle, and the Middle Sioux adopted a mixed
lifestyle.3 75 The "Seven Council Fires" outlined in Figure 1 emerged at
the time of the Sioux migration to the Great Plains. 7 As of the 1800s,
the separate divisions of the Sioux (Santee, Yankton, and Teton) carried
more meaning than the Sioux nation as a whole. Nonetheless,
individuals have also always moved fluidly between bands, divisions,
and reservations.r
i.

Eastern Sioux (DakotaDialect/Santee)

When the Sioux divisions dispersed, the Santee division remained
furthest east, retaining an ethos much closer to that of woodland tribes
such as the Ojibwa and the Potawatomi, than to that of the Nakota or
Lakota divisions of the Sioux tribe.378 The Eastern Sioux maintained a
more sedentary, agricultural life, while the Yankton and Teton divisions
migrated west and focused on a nomadic way of life. 3 79 The Santee are
the oldest division of the original Sioux nation.38 The Yankton and
Teton divisions based their governing structure on the Tiyospayes (the
extended family units), whereas the Santee's sedentary life allowed for
greater interaction between clans.
The Santee became a separate band when they moved away from the
larger group in search of food and then became named for the place
where they settled.382 The group then further divided into four of the
374. Id.

375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 77, 84.
Lakota Winter Counts: Social Structure, supra note 351.
See, e.g., GIBBON, supra note 4, at 208.
Stephen A. Feraca & James H. Howard, The Identity and Demography of the Dakota or

Sioux Tribe, 8 PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST 80, 80-82 (1963).
379. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 19.

380. Feraca & Howard, supranote 378, at 82.
381. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 20-21.
382. PALMER, supranote 4, at 42-43.
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seven council fires in the 1800s (Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Wahpeton,
and Sisseton). Exemplifying the fluidity of Sioux affiliations, some of
the Wahpeton bands lived with the Sisseton and Yankton in the 1800s.114
The Sisseton were the fourth Santee council fire to form. 3 85 Eroding the
idea of a monolithic Sioux identity, each band was considered to have its
own character.3 86
By 1803, most Eastern Santee Sioux lived between the Mississippi
and Missouri rivers, east of the 100th meridian.38 ' However, they faced
intense pressure from the north, south, and east by whites and other
tribes throughout the 1830s. 3 18 In 1837, the Santee sold its land east of
Mississippi to the U.S. government, resulting in the tribe's dependence
on government support during the ensuing decades. 389 The Santee
migrated west and by 1839 around 4000 Santee lived in southern
Minnesota and the eastern Dakotas.390
With the 1851 Second Treaty of Traverse des Sioux and the Treaty of
Mendota,3 91 the Santee moved farther west and ceded all of its all
Dakota land between the Mississippi and Big Sioux rivers, from central
Minnesota into northern Iowa.392 The resulting Santee reservation
consisted of a ten-mile swath of land on both sides of the upper
Minnesota River that ran about 150 miles from Lake Traverse in the
west, to Little Rock Creek in the east.393 Upon Minnesota statehood in
1858, government officials forced the Santee to cede the north side of
the Minnesota River to the new state or risk seeing the state claim the
entire reservation.394
The incessant encroachment on their land, and Santee concern over
383. Id. at 42-46. The Mdewakanton was considered the first tribe from which all the other
council fires originated. The Wahpekute and Wahpeton were the second or third hearths to form. (It
is not clear which came first.) See id. at 43-44.
384. Id. at 46.
385. Id.
386. Id.at 44-46.
387. GIBBoN, supra note 4, at 78.
388. Id.at 81.
389. Id.at 83.
390. Id. at 79.
391. See Treaty of Traverse des Sioux, U.S.-See-see-toan and Wah-pay-toan Bands of the Dakota
or Sioux Indians, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949 (spelling in original); Treaty of Mendota, U.S.-Meday-wa-kan-toan and Wah-pay-koo-tay bands of the Dakota and Sioux Indians, Aug. 5, 1851, 10
Stat. 954 (spelling in original).
392. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 109.
393. Id.
394. Id.

1110

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1041

intermarriage and acculturation, set the stage for the 1862 Minnesota
Sioux Uprising, in which the Santee Sioux besieged a non-Indian town
and took over the Indian Agency offices." The aftermath led to further
blurring of Sioux divisions and affiliations. The federal government, in
retaliation for the uprising, negated all Dakota treaty rights, confiscated
the Santee's land, and banished the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute from
Minnesota. While the Sisseton and Wahpeton were allowed to stay in
Minnesota, almost all left out of fear of reprisal.397 At least 3000 Santee
fled westward to live with the Yanktonai and Lakota in North Dakota.398
In general, there was much Eastern Sioux migration during the 1860s
and 1870s due to disillusionment with certain reservations (Crow
Creek), and the aftermath of the 1862 Uprising.399 Some Santee Sioux
mixed with the Western Teton Sioux and adopted that lifestyle, while
other Santee Sioux acculturated with white communities in Minnesota
and at the Flandreau settlement (discussed further below).400
For the Santee who did not merge with other cultural entities, on
February 19, 1867, two reservations were established-Lake Traverse
and Devil's Lake (now Spirit Lake). 4 0 1 The Devil's Lake reservation was
established for Santee who migrated across the plains, as well as
Yanktonai who had previously occupied the area.4 02 Most of the
Christianized Sioux were on the Sisseton reservation (Lake Traverse),
while Indians who held closer to traditional religion were placed on
Devil's Lake.403 Devil's Lake also had an influx of Teton families
nominally assigned to the Standing Rock reservation, as well as some
lower Sioux from the Turtle Mountain area.404 As a result, there was a
high degree of cultural diversity among the Indians on the Devil's Lake
reservation compared to the Lake Traverse reservation.40 5
In one of the most unique expressions of the complexity of Sioux

395. Id. at 110.
396. Id. at 111.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. CLIFFORD ALLEN ET AL., FLANDREAU SANTEE Sioux TRIBE, HISTORY OF THE FLANDREAU
SANTEE Sioux TRIBE 61 (1971).

400. Id.
401. RON MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIoux: UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY ON TRIAL

220 (rev. ed. 1993).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 223.
404. Id. at 223-24.
405. Id. at 224.
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tribal identity, in 1869, twenty-five families left the Santee reservations
without Indian Agency authorization and settled on unoccupied land in
the valley of the Big Sioux River.406 They renounced their tribal ties and
claims to benefits, and applied for homesteads in order to create the
Flandreau settlement. 4 07 The families doubled to fifty in the fall of 1869
and their population hovered around 300 during 1890s. 408 The Flandreau
community's living conditions through the 1800s were similar to those
of their white pioneer neighbors, and by the end of 1800s they were
better off economically than the Sisseton, Devil's Lake Tribe, or the
Minnesota Santee.409 While the Flandreau residents were Sioux by
blood, they relinquished their tribal affiliation to become citizens of the
United States.4 10 In an interesting twist, the Flandreau community was
nonetheless recognized as a tribe in the Sioux Treaty of 1889.411 Their
tribal affiliation proved critical for the Flandreau in the early twentieth
century when they relied on their government-to-government
relationship to obtain assistance during economically challenging
times. 412
ii.

Middle Sioux (Nakota Dialect/Yankton and Yanktonai)

During the late eighteenth century, the Nakota moved into the eastern
Dakotas; by 1804 Lewis and Clark reported that the Yankton lived
among the James, Des Moines, and Big Sioux rivers in eastern South
Dakota and northwestern Iowa, and Yanktonai lived along the
headwaters of the Big Sioux, James, and Red rivers in what is now
North Dakota.4 13 By the 1830s around 4000 Yanktonai had moved
westward beyond the Dakotas, with around 1000 staying east with the
Sisseton (Santee).4 14
As the Nakota migrated, they maintained some gardening and villages
like the Eastern Sioux, but also adopted new habits such as hunting
bison in the summer and living in lodges during the winter.415 Unlike

406. Id. at 242.
407. Id. at 245-46.
408. Id. at 247, 256.

409. Id. at 252, 256.
410. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 399, at 116.
411. Id.; see Act of Mar. 2, 1889, chs. 404, 405, 25 Stat. 888.
412. Id. at 87-89.
413. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 83.
414. Id. at 84.
415. Id. at 84, 108.
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either their eastern or western cousins, the Nakota spent most of the year
in permanent villages.4 16 As mentioned above, the basic unit of the
Nakota (and of the Teton division below) was the Tiyospayes, which
consisted of ten to twenty conjugal families that functioned essentially as
one large familial unit.4 17
With the Treaty of Prairie de Chine in 1830, the Yankton ceded title
to their land in the Des Moines River region in return for a $3000
annuity and services.4 18 Although they ceded interest to an additional
two million acres in the Treaty of October 21, 1837, in general the land
base of the Middle Sioux was not as heavily affected during this period
as that of the Eastern Sioux. 419
In yet another example of the fluidity of band affiliation among the
Sioux, in 1830 the Yankton were joined by a small group of dissident
Wahpekute Dakota who retained their Santee identity for many years,
but operated politically as part of Yankton tribe.4 20 Interaction was
common between the Middle and Eastern Sioux, and Santees by birth
might be Yankton in terms of tribal allegiance.4 21
By the 1850s American settlers were encroaching on the Yankton
territory in large numbers, and on April 19, 1858, a number of Yankton
Chiefs were pressured to sign a treaty ceding the remaining majority of
their territory.4 22 In the Treaty of Washington in 1858, they gave up over
eleven million acres on the delta between the Big Sioux and Missouri
rivers in exchange for a 430,000-acre reservation in the Missouri Hills of
South Dakota and fifty years of government services and rations.423 In
1896, the Yankton were forced to sell more than half of this reservation
and
Meanwhile, the Yankton an
land through the allotment program. 424thYako
Yanktonai who did not settle on the reservation land in the late 1800s
followed the retreating bison herds westward into Lakota Territory.425
Most modern Yankton still live on or nearby the reservation lands
established in the 1800s, with concentrations in the towns of Yankton,

416. Id. at 84.
417. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 13.
418. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 86.
419. See id.

420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See HOOVER, supranote 4, at 30.

423. Id
424. Id.
425. See GIBBON, supra note 4, at 113.
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Wagner, Greenwood, Marty, Ravinia, and Lake Andes.426 The tribes and
reservations primarily associated with the Middle Sioux include the
Yankton Reservation, Standing Rock, and Crow Creek.4 27 The size of
the Yankton population is average for tribes in the Sioux federation, and
their economic and cultural situation is considered representative of the
Sioux in general.428
iii.

Western Sioux (The Seven Lakota or Teton Tribes)

Various influences, including the lure of abundant beaver populations
and migrating buffalo herds, drove the migration of the Western Sioux
tribes in the late eighteenth century and through much of the nineteenth
century, while the Eastern Sioux remained in the eastern woodlands.42 9
At their height, the Western Sioux consisted of twenty sub-bands.430
Seven sub-bands survive: Oglala, Brule (Sicangu), Sans Arcs (Itazipco),
Sihasapa (Black Foot), Minikonjou, Oohenonpa (Two Kettles of
Cheyenne River), and the Hunkpapa. 4 3 1 Both the Oglala and Brule claim
that they are the parent group of all the Lakota sub-bands, but most
experts believe it was the Oglala from which the other sub-bands
emerged. 4 32 While Lakota sub-bands appear as yet another layer of
Sioux identity, it is unclear how effectively they capture ethnic unity.
Sub-bands merged and separated as needed for hunting, or for military
purposes.4 33 Bands such as the Brules were rarely together as one unit
(pre-reservation) due to the requirements of hunting,434 and the
Hunkpapa (the last Lakota sub-band to form) often allied with the
Yankton.435
During the early 1800s, the Lakota began to move onto the western
plains because of conflict with neighboring tribes and encroaching
whites, as well as to follow the large herds of buffalo.436 By 1804, the
Lakota were already migrating as far west as the Rockies and the Platte
426. See HOOVER, supra note 4, at 95-96, 105.
427. See id. at 105.
428. See HOOVER, supra note 4, at 22.
429. See Richard White, The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,65 J. AM. HIST. 321-22, 334-35 (1978).
430. PALMER, supranote 4, at 43.
431. DANIELS,supra note 349, at 215.
432. JOSEPH CASH, THE SIouX PEOPLE 6 (1971).

433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 20-23.
Id. at 6.
PALMER, supra note 4, at 51.
Lakota Winter Counts: Social Structure,supra note 351.
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River, and north to the Saskatchewan River.43 7 Their adaptation to the
plains was greatly accelerated and their lifestyle radically altered by
acquiring horses. 438 By the 1830s, the Lakota had moved so far west that
they were warring with the Crow for control of the Powder River
country south of Yellowstone River in eastern Wyoming.43 9 In response
to the declining bison population and the Oglala, Brules, and
Miniconjous migration into hunting grounds of the Platte River Valley,
the Sioux Alliance formed in the 1820s. The alliance, which provides yet
another example of fluid Sioux affiliations, consisted of Oglalas, Brules,
Miniconjou, Yankton, Yanktonai, Northern Cheyenne, and Northern
Arapaho. 44 0 The Lakota and their successful Sioux Alliance eventually
seized territory from the Iowa, Ponca, Pawnee, Arikara, Mandan,
Hidatsa, Assiniboin, Kiowa, Crow, and Cheyenne.44 1
The Lakota prospered on the plains, and outnumbered the combined
Eastern and Middle Sioux.442 There were an estimated 25,000 Lakota in
the 1800s. 44 3 The Lakota lifestyle (also adopted by some Middle Sioux)
differed significantly from the majority of the Middle and Eastern
Sioux's lifestyle. 4 They acquired horses, lived in tipis, and were
nomadic. They exhibited the "classic Plains complex" that existed from
1800 to 1880 including: war bonnets, bison robes, medicine bundles,
horse gear, horsemanship, and the Sun Dance. 4 4 5 Their itinerancy
protected them somewhat from the devastation of infectious diseases
that swept through more sedentary tribes, allowing them to flourish and
dominate their territory.4 46 The bison was central to Lakota culture and
wealth, and due to hunting and hide trading, the early to mid- nineteenth
century was a period of unprecedented wealth for the Lakota.447
The 1860s and 1870s were the climax of northern plains warfare and
the military glory of the Sioux Alliance, which numbered 20,000 Indians
in 1865, 5000 of whom were warriors.448 Despite this Alliance, by the
437. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 86-87.
438. See Lakota Winter Counts: Who Are The Lakota, supra note 365.
439. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 87.
440. Id. at 88.
441. Id.

442. Id.
443. PALMER, supra note 4, at 48.
444. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 89.
445. Id.

446. Id.
447. Id. at 90.
448. Id. at 115.
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late 1800s the Western Sioux would succumb to the federal
government's splintering and dividing forces. In 1868, some Lakota
bands gave in to the relentless pressure to live on reservations and avoid
conflict with the whites, and they signed the Treaty of Fort Laramie to
create the Great Sioux Reservation.44 9 Other Lakota who refused to be
confined to reservations saw their livelihood destroyed when, between
1872 and 1874, non-Indian hunters killed over three million bison on the
plains, driving the species to extinction by the end of the decade.4 50 In
1876, the U.S. Government ordered the remaining itinerant hunting
bands of Sioux to report to the reservations, and set out to destroy the
camps of non-complying bands in order to force them to do so. 451' This
led to Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse's war with the U.S. government,
culminating in the Battle of Little Bighorn.4 52 Little Big Horn instigated
fierce retribution from the U.S. government, and the Winter of 1877
campaign forced most of the remaining Lakota Sioux onto reservations
or into Canada, thus shattering the mighty federation of Lakota bands. 45 3
The well-known story of the Lakota's loss of the Black Hills in
particular illustrates the relentless pressure to seize aboriginal lands
whenever resources valuable to the non-Indian community came to

light. 454
The current-day Lakota reservations were carved from the Great
Sioux Reservation as it was dismantled during the late 1800s. The Great
Sioux Settlement of 1889 reduced the Great Sioux Reservation to six
separate reservations: Rosebud, Lower Brule, Standing Rock, Cheyenne
River, Crow Creek, and Pine Ridge.4 55 The reservations were chosen for
a variety of reasons, including their proximity to agencies for the
purpose of military control.4 56 About one-half of modern Lakota live on

449. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, U.S.-Sioux, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.
450. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 114.
451. Id. at 116.
452. Id. at 116-17.
453. Id. at 117.
454. See OSTLER, supra note 363, at 69-74 (describing the immediate conflicts in interpretation
of the 1868 Treaty between Lakota leaders and the federal government, stemming in large part from
pressure to seek gold in the Black Hills); id. at 85-92 (describing role that Custer's reports of gold
in the Black Hills had on subsequent efforts to divest Lakota of those lands). For a detailed legal
history of this conflict, see generally EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIoux
NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991).

455. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, chs. 404, 405, 25 Stat. 888.
456. See OSTLER, supra note 363, at 73-74 (describing process of selecting agencies for the
Dakota bands, which would eventually become their reservations).
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or near these reservations.4 57 Similar to the Eastern and Middle Sioux,
the Western Sioux reservations and tribes offer diverse examples of both
intermixed and cohesive cultural units.45 8 The Pine Ridge and Lower
Brule Reservations were noteworthy because their inhabitants (until the
1970s) were nearly all descendants of one pre-reservation social unit. 4 59
However, as of 1975 the Lower Brule Reservation population was
divided approximately equally between mixed-bloods and full-bloodswith tension between the two groups. 460 Similarly, the Oohenunpa band
(or Two Kettles) survived into modern times as a separate entity on the
Cheyenne River Reservation. In comparison, the Rosebud Reservation
462
has many members with Brule ancestry, Oglala ancestry, and LakotaPonca ancestry; the Standing Rock tribe includes both Hunkpapa Lakota
and Yanktonai Nakotas; and the Cheyenne River Sioux include
individuals from the Minikonjou, Oohenonpa, Itazipco, and Shasapa
sub-tribes.463
2.

The Dakota Today: A Snapshot of the FederallyRecognized Tribes
in North and South Dakota

Sioux history continues to unfold for the ten federally recognized
Sioux tribes of North and South Dakota: Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Sisseton
Wahpeton Oyate of The Lake Traverse Reservation, Oglala Sioux Tribe,
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, Yankton Sioux
Reservation, Crow Creek Sioux Reservation, and the Spirit Lake Tribe.
The mixed membership and shifting enrollments within some of these
tribes indicate the complexities of tribal membership as an affiliation.
The migration of members between tribes reflects the continuity of
Indian and/or Sioux identity notwithstanding the legal boundaries
established by reservations and distinct federally recognized tribes. For
example, two tribes include in their enrollment statistics the number of
tribal members who have relinquished their membership to join other
tribes. The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, which has a total enrollment of

457. Lakota Winter Counts: Who Are The Lakota, supra note 365.
458. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 349, at 223.
459. Id. at 216.
460. ERNEST L. SCHUSKY, THE FORGOTTEN Sloux: AN ETHNOHISTORY OF THE LOWER BRULE
RESERVATION 227 (1975).

461. PALMER, supra note 44, at 51.
462. CASH, supra note 432, at 54.

463. DANIELS, supra note 349, at 233.
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5069 members, 1230 of whom live on the Crow Creek Reservation,
reported in 2011 that 180 individuals had relinquished their Crow Creek
enrollment to join other tribes.464 The Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe,
which has 759 enrolled members and 1266 members of other tribes
residing on their lands (mostly attributable to the Flandreau Indian
School), reported that approximately forty of their members disenrolled
to join other tribes, and 250 relinquished other tribal affiliations to join
Flandreau.465 Similar phenomena of enrollment and relinquishment are
evident for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe,466 a much larger tribe with over
21,000 enrolled members living on its reservation.46 7
Given the static boundaries imposed on the Dakota people as a result
of carving up their aboriginal territory into discrete reservations, it is not
surprising that membership in a federally recognized tribe is, for some,
not necessarily paramount to tribal identity. The degree of migration,
disenrollment, and reenrollment reflects the extent to which Dakota
people still identify with the larger Dakota Nation, notwithstanding the
political and legal significance of membership in a particular tribe.468 At
the same time, the federally recognized tribe has become the primary site
of identity for many, as well as the symbol for the persistence of separate
Dakota political and cultural existence. For members of the ten federally
recognized tribes that once comprised part of the Great Dakota Nation,
identity (including its racial, political, and cultural aspects) derives from
the history and politics that lie within current legal distinctions.

464. E-mails from Rozelle Lockwood, Enrollment Specialist, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, to
Nancy Smith (Jan. 26, 2011 and Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author).
465. E-mail from Scott Anderson, Benefits Eligibility Specialist, Tribal Enrollment Office,
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, to author (Jan. 25, 2011) (on file with author).
466. At one time, general enrollment and relinquishment numbers were available on the internet.
See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Culture, Le Oyate Ki, http://www.rosebudsiouxtribe-nsn.gov/
index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=61&ltemid=68 (last visited June 7, 2012, but no
longer available). The general information is no longer publicly available, but Rosebud Tribal
Council Meeting minutes corroborate that enrollment and relinquishment do occur. See Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Council Minutes of Oct. 4, 2011 (documenting Tribal Council approval of motions to
enroll new members and to accept relinquishment by existing members) (on file with author).
467. Nine

Tribes

in

South

Dakota,

S.D.

DEPARTMENT

TRIBAL

Gov'T

REL.,

http://www.sdtribalrelations.com/rosebud.aspx (last visited June 7, 2012).
468. The phenomenon of migration and changing membership also reflects the evolution of a
broader pan-Indian identity. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal
Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & Soc'y REv. 1123, 1140-45 (1994)
(describing rise of pan-Indian political and social organizing in response to policies and actions
threatening all tribes).
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SETTLER COLONIALISM, THE ELIMINATIONIST AGENDA,
AND THE RACIAL FORMATION OF NATIVE PEOPLES

The general history of tribal federal recognition and membership in
Part I and the specific histories of the CRIT and Sioux Tribes in Part II
reveal how race was constructed in the American Indian context. The
concept of the inferior and disappearing tribe justified laws and policies
that fixed tribes in time and space in order to diminish their separate
status and claims to land. The means of achieving Indian elimination
varied. In the CRIT context, the predominant approach was to
consolidate distinct ethnic and linguistic groups into one tribe on one
reservation. The Sioux story, by contrast, is characterized by scattering
connected groups into many smaller tribes (with smaller reservations).
Throughout these two histories, as well as the broader history of federal
recognition, the government's role in entangling race, blood, and tribal
status to achieve the ends of shrinking Indian tribes and their claims to
land is evident.
In their influential work on racism in the United States, Michael Omi
and Howard Winant coined the term "racial formation," which they
defined as "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are
created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed."4 69 Omi and Winant
posit that the initial essentialist construction of race, which ascribed
inferior characteristics to groups based on allegedly biological traits,
performed certain key historical functions (such as the expropriation of
land and labor.) Yet once the category of race is created, and social
ordering based on racism occurs, neither the category nor the social
ordering disappear despite the absence of biological bases for racial
distinctions. Race, though a social construct and not a biological trait,
thus acquires and produces cultural meanings that continue to infuse our
everyday encounters and structure aspects of our society. 47 0 Rather than
jettison race as an archaic misconception, Omi and Winant urge that "[a]
more effective starting point is the recognition that despite its
uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a
fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world."4 7 1
Although they mention American Indians in passing, Omi and Winant
do not account separately for the racial formation of indigenous peoples
historically, nor do they grapple with the unique legacies of racism on

469. OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 55.
470. See id. at 54-61.
471. Id. at 55.
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American Indian communities and individuals. 472 Patrick Wolfe,
however, has applied a similar framework when analyzing the
racialization of indigenous peoples in settler-colonial societies.4 As
theorized by Wolfe, settler-colonial societies, such as Australia and the
United States, are those where the colonizing people came to stay and
quickly outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants.4 74 Traditional
colonialism, as was imposed in much of Africa and India, was
characterized by small numbers of colonizers dependent on much larger
numbers of native people for labor. 4 7 5 To extract value from the land,
traditional colonial societies required the continued presence of their
subordinated labor force.4 76 By contrast, "settler colonies were not
primarily established to extract surplus value from indigenous labour.
Rather, they are premised on displacing indigenes from (or replacing
them on) the land."A7 The racial project for indigenous peoples was
therefore one of elimination: "Settler colonies were (are) premised on
the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a
determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to
stay-invasion is a structure not an event." 4 7 8
Wolfe's work on the racialization of indigenous people focuses
largely on miscegenation and assimilation laws and policies. 479 The
histories of federal recognition and membership composition discussed
above add yet another dimension to explicating the eliminationist
project: Federally recognized tribes were consolidated and concentrated
from the previously un-quantified (and therefore, beyond state control)
472. Omi and Winant discuss Native Americans specifically in just two places in their book. See
id. at 61-62 (discussing the age of "discovery" and religiously inspired precursors to racialization of
American Indians); id. at 80 (describing Native opposition to racism).
473. See generally Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28.
474. See WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supranote 8, at 1-2.

475. See id.
476. See id.
477. Id. at I (emphasis in original); see also Berger, supra note 9. Berger traces the divergent
paths of racism against African Americans and American Indians, and concludes that Indians'
racialization took the form of denigration of their collective tribal existence. Breaking up the tribe,
and liberating the land and resources, was the political and economic objective served:
European Americans were not primarily concerned with using Indian people as a source of
labor, and so did not have to theorize Indians as inferior individuals to justify the unfair terms
of that labor. Rather, colonists' primary concern with respect to Indians was to obtain tribal
resources and use tribes as a flattering foil for American society and culture.
Id. at 593.
478. WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 2.

479. See generally id.; see also Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, But see
Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, supra note 8, at 391-92 (addressing
treaty interpretation and property law manifestations of the eliminationist agenda).
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groups of tribally affiliated Indians. The very process of recognition
reduced tribes from free and independent peoples (with potentially vast
claims to land) to manageable units, which could be bargained with,
reduced, and ultimately displaced.4 80
The CRIT and Dakota stories contain characteristics that are
generalizable, particularly when placed in the larger historical context of
how tribes evolved from free and independent nations to federally
recognized tribes. First, the politics that constructed federally recognized
tribes included recurring pressures to shrink aboriginal claims to
territory.48 1 Second, justifications for shrinking territory were often
couched in narratives of the tribe's waste (or non-use) of resources, with
necessarily negative characterizations of Indian people. 4 82 Third, the
fluidity with which Indian tribes defined their own members prior to
European contact was necessarily compromised by the federal
government's imposition on tribes of regimes of land and resource
scarcity.483 Fourth, today, federally recognized tribes nonetheless include
considerable ethnic diversity among enrolled members, as well as
varying kinds of political and social affiliations that extend beyond
enrolled membership.4 84
Folded within each history are the forms of racialization that applied
to American Indians more generally. First, to justify divisions among
tribes between those that were considered allies and those that were not,
Indian agents and the federal government (including the courts) ascribed
wild and unruly characteristics to some tribes and friendly and docile
(assimilable) characteristics to others. 4 85 Then, as it became clear that no
tribe was docile or friendly enough to justify standing in the way of nonIndian settlement, assimilation of individuals and the destruction of the
tribe qua tribe became the dominant objective.4 86 Thus, during the
allotment era, all tribes, regardless of degree of assimilation, were
deemed to have inferior qualities that were ineradicable except by
480. See supra Part II.B.
481. See supra Part IL.A.4.
482. See supra Part II.A.2; see also OSTLER, supra note 363, at 88-89 (describing justifications
for taking the Black Hills from the Lakota). Ostler recounts that Custer declared the Black Hills
region as unoccupied and "'seldom visited by [the Indians.] It is used as sort of a back-room to
which they may escape after committing depredations."' Id. at 88. Another commentator of the
times put it this way: "'The grand and beautiful Eden just discovered. . .' should not be left in the
hands of 'the most obstinately depraved nomad that bears the 'human form divine."' Id.
483.
484.
485.
486.

See supra Part I.B.1 .b.
See supra Parts II.A and .B.1.
See supratext accompanying notes 169-71.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-50.
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dissolution of group status. Winnowing the number of people with tribal
affiliation (through the creation of membership rolls and the inclusion of
descent or blood quantum based criteria) was a way to ensure the
eventual extinction of tribes themselves. By the time policies of selfdetermination became ascendant, all of this history was baked into what
it meant to be an American Indian tribe.

For the CRIT, the overriding sense from history is that, from the
federal government's perspective, all Indians in the area were fungible
and ultimately disposable. The Indian Service attempted repeatedly to
justify its failure to consolidate all tribes of the lower Colorado River
onto one reservation with efforts to increase the CRIT population in
other ways. When early attempts to locate tribes other than the Mohave
and Chemehuevi failed, allotment seemed to be the best solution. When
allotment efforts failed to shrink the CRIT reservation by opening it for
non-Indian settlement, federal agents tried yet another strategy:
relocating Navajo and Hopi tribal members who themselves were
objects of failed government policies to contain and control tribes and
their homelands. Throughout, federal officials referred to the waste of
resources that would otherwise result if lands set aside in the 1865
statute (with subsequent additions) were home only to a paltry number
of Indians. The multi-linguistic, multi-cultural composition of today's
Colorado River Indian Tribe is the outcome of that statist project of
racialized consolidation, 487 even while today CRIT itself exercises its
powers of self-government and inherent sovereignty to further a living,
complicated culture with ties to its several indigenous peoples.
The history of the ten federally recognized tribes in North and South
Dakota reflects the eliminationist agenda in similar as well as distinct
ways. For the affiliated peoples of the Great Dakota Nation, their
presence throughout the upper Midwest and Great Plains seemed
initially to require a global territorial solution.488 After the Civil War,
when pressure and desire to settle the western territories increased, that
solution was inadequate. The subsequent break-up of the Great Sioux
Nation followed the dictates of non-Indian desire for land and resources
rather than any pre-existing identities claimed by the many Dakota bands
and affiliations. To some extent, peoples of common language, political
structure, and tradition were assembled within a federally recognized
tribe on a reservation having some connection to their aboriginal lands.

487. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 56 (defining "racial projects").
488. See supra Part II.B. .b; see also Treaty of Traverse des Sioux, U.S. See-see-toan and Wahpay-toan Bands of the Dakota or Sioux Indians, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949 (spelling in original).
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But that was due more to the will and agency of the bands themselves
than the design of the federal government.
Wolfe's observation that "invasion is a structure not an event,"4 89
applies forcefully to the CRIT and Sioux tribes today. Invasion
structured the membership composition of the CRIT and Sioux tribes
according to non-Indian desire for land and resources, and the political
and legal consequences for the tribes persist. Internally, the CRIT and
Sioux tribal governments struggle to reconcile the divergent cultures and
backgrounds of their members. Externally, the tribes must defend their
legal and political sovereignty (derived from their pre-contact status as
independent peoples and recognized in the US constitution) even though
the form it takes necessarily reflects the history of invasion.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Politics and law construct race, and the racial characteristics assigned
to certain groups then generate their own politics and law. Accepting
those premises necessarily implies acceptance of the conclusion that
different politico-legal goals motivated the construction of different
racial groups. As discussed above, for American Indian tribes, the
overriding characteristic of their racialization was the goal of
elimination. Therefore, the overriding characteristic of redress for tribes
is to perpetuate their existence as distinct peoples.4 9 0 Today, that means
supporting classifications that further the unique obligations that
Congress has to tribes regardless of whether they incorporate
membership criteria that (inevitably) reflect the racializing project
imposed on them. A source no less than the leading Indian law treatise
makes the same point: "A sound reading of Morton v. Mancari would
acknowledge that even though ancestry may figure into some Indian
classifications, ultimately the most important inquiry is whether the law
can be justified as fulfilling 'Congress' unique obligation toward the

489. WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 2.

490. This overriding characteristic applies to classifications affecting tribes and, by extension,
classifications (largely in the form of preferences and benefits) that apply to Indians as members of
tribes. There are also still many instances and forms of racism against individual Indians that require
the full range of individual civil rights remedies, including those of perpetuating their tribal
connection. See Rolnick, supra note 9, at 959-68; see also Berger,supra note 9, at 594-95. In other
words, redress for the eliminationist harms perpetrated against tribes requires certain forms of
response (support for tribes as peoples). Redress-for lack of a better word-for more generic
forms of racism against Indians requires the full range of civil rights remedies, including sometimes
restoring connections to their tribe. See Rolnick, supra note 9, at 1036-45 (coming to similar
conclusions).
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Indians."' 49 1 The legal histories of CRIT and the Great Dakota Nation
illuminate the wisdom of this view, and highlight the thicket that lies
behind any judicial attempt to unwind the racial from the political with
respect to that aspect of Mancari.
The following brief review of how courts have addressed equal
protection issues since Mancari reinforces the conclusion that courts risk
furthering the settler-colonial project rather than reversing it when they
stray from inquiring whether a classification can be justified as fulfilling
"Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians." Post-Mancari,courts
have faced four types of equal protection challenges in the American
Indian context. First, similar to Mancari itself, non-Indians continue to
challenge laws that confer benefits on Indians and tribes.492 Second,
nonmember Indians have challenged a federal law, known as the Durofix legislation, that recognized inherent tribal powers to prosecute
nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians, for tribal crimes. 493 Third,
courts have addressed equal protection challenges brought by
nonmember Indians to legislation that gives preference to tribal
members.49 4 Fourth, Indians have brought equal protection challenges to
federal criminal prosecution.4 95 While most courts that address these
questions find them easily resolved under Mancari, the creep of colorblind jurisprudence and its ahistorical approach to racial formation
generally, and Indian law specifically, is evident in a few cases that fall
in the first two categories. Those categories are, therefore, addressed in

491. COHEN, supra note 42,

§ 14.03[2][b],

at 927 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555

(1974)).

492. See infra IV.A; see also Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce,
694 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding HUD preference for Indian-owned companies to build
housing for Indians); Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980) (upholding tribal
employment preference against equal protection challenge brought by non-Indian former police
chief); Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding New Mexico statute
granting only Indians the right to display and sell handcrafted jewelry on grounds of public
museum).
493. See infra Part IV.B.
494. See Mullenberg v. United States, 857 F.2d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting equal protection
challenge by nonmember Indian to IHS Indian employment preference). But see Dawavenda v. Salt
River Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Indian
preference policy that favored members of one federally recognized tribe over another violated Title
VII prohibition on national origin discrimination).
495. See United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to federal criminal prosecution, reasoning that the claim was indistinguishable from the
one rejected in Antelope); cf United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding
conviction of defendant for assault on an Indian child on grounds that government had met its
burden to prove victim was a member of an Indian tribe and that classification was political,
pursuant to Antelope).
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more detail below.
A.

Challengesby Non-Indians to ClassificationsConferringBenefits
on Indians

Since Mancari, non-Indian plaintiffs have continued to bring equal
protection challenges to classifications that afford distinctive treatment
to American Indians and American Indian tribes. These challenges can
be divided into two groups: challenges to religious exemptions specific
to Indians and challenges to economic legislation, in particular Indian
gaming laws.
The religious exemption cases, when brought as equal protection
challenges, have generally been rejected based on Mancari.49 In Peyote
Way Church of God v. Thornburgh,4 97 the Fifth Circuit upheld federal
legislation exempting Native American Church (NAC) members from
statutes prohibiting peyote possession against an equal protection
challenge. 498 The court had no difficulty concluding that the NAC
membership requirements, which included twenty-five percent Native
ancestry as well as membership in a federally recognized tribe, met the
"political classification" test, and therefore applied Mancari's rational
basis approach. 4 9 9 The court then concluded that the NAC exemption
furthered the legitimate governmental purpose of preserving Native
American religion.oo Other religious exemption cases have had similar
outcomes.ol
Viewed in the context of the racial formation of tribes, for which the
perpetuation of tribal culture is an appropriate form of redress, the
approach followed in Peyote Way Church of God is the right one. Part of
the eliminationist agenda was the destruction of tribal religion and
culture.502 Affirming congressional and administrative efforts to
496. Some challenges to religious exemptions have succeeded when brought under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, however. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).
497. 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
498. See id. at 1211.
499. See id. at 1216.
500. See id.
501. See, e.g., Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1992)
(upholding Indian religious exemption for eagle feather possession). The court applied equal
protection analysis to the claim, which had been brought as an establishment clause challenge. See
id.
502. See generally Allison Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of NineteenthCentury ChristianizationPolicy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49
STAN. L. REv. 773 (1997) (describing Allotment era's destruction of religion); see also Berger,
supra note 9, at 628-39 (discussing destruction of culture as linked to racialization of the tribe
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perpetuate American Indian religious practices, even as they evolve in
pan-Indian forms like the NAC, is a constructive step toward reversing
elimination. At the same time, the "religion and culture" equal protection
cases may not be the most challenging ones in terms of unsettling the
paradigm of the disappearing Indian. Perpetuating Native culture is
crucial, yet (with important exceptions) can coexist with stereotypical
notions of Indians fixed in time and space, and importantly, pose no
threat to economic interests.so3
The harder cases, in terms of unsettling racially constructed ideas
about Indians, are the ones recognizing tribal powers to engage in
economic activity. In particular, non-Indian plaintiffs have brought
challenges to laws that recognize tribes' exclusive powers to operate
gaming activities within states. Similar to the equal protection/religion
cases, to date, these challenges have been rejected. 50 4 But language in
the recent case of KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patric 05 adverts to

the ease with which some courts might start to employ racial vocabulary
to undermine tribal sovereignty. In KG Urban Enterprises, a federal
district court in Massachusetts upheld a Massachusetts gaming law that
authorized casino-style gaming and established a scheme for issuing
licenses for different categories of gaming.' Consistent with the federal
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,507 the Massachusetts law authorized
gaming compacts with federally recognized Indian tribes and required at
least one member of the state's Gaming Policy Advisory Committee to
be a representative of a federally recognized Indian tribe. The
Massachusetts Act also provided that if the state "enters into a Tribal
State gaming compact with an Indian tribe, the Gaming commission will
not issue a Category One license" for one of the designated geographic

during allotment).
503. The exceptions include cases in which Indian claims to culture and religion raise questions
about land use. These are more threatening to the established order because they raise the specter,
realistic or not, of Indians reclaiming vast swaths of land. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see also Kristen Carpenter, A PropertyRights Approach to
Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Placefor Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1061 (2005)
(analyzing Lyng and related cases and proposing property rights approach in light of repeated poor
outcomes in the First Amendment context).
504. See Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding
gaming compacts under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act between the state of California and
Indian tribes).
505. 839 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D. Mass.) affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 693 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2012).
506. See id.
507. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2721 (2006).
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regions of the state.508 KG Urban Enterprises, a non-Indian company that
had acquired a former brownfields site in order to develop a multi-level
casino and shopping/retail and conference center, challenged the
509
Massachusetts law on equal protection and other grounds.
The district court upheld the law, but first questioned the Mancari
distinction between the "political" category of the federal recognized
tribe and the "racial" composition of tribal membership:
The government's power to regulate Indian affairs, which
implicates weighty constitutional issues, should not rise or fall
on a facile distinction. "Federally recognized tribes" are quasisovereign political entities, to be sure, which is why some courts
characterize the classification as political. Their members,
however, share more than a like-minded spirit of civic
participation; they share the same racialheritage.510
The court then cited to articles by Indian law scholars to support this
conclusion. 5 ' The court used the nuanced work of these scholars, whose
analyses are embedded in the history of ideological and structural forces
that shaped tribal membership into membership by descent, 5 12 to
conclude that tribal membership relies on "racial heritage." That the
court used the term "racial heritage" is significant. The term implies a
distinctly biological and essentialist understanding of tribal membership
requirements, as opposed to the more accurate understanding that the
descent-based requirements were (and in many cases still are) an
inevitable artifact of the political relationship (wrought by historical,
ideological, and structural forces) between tribes and the federal
government.513
Despite the court's disquiet over the Supreme Court's failure to
grapple "with complex constitutional issues such as the scope of
congressional power to regulate Indian affairs and the inherent tension
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause,"
it concluded that the state gaming law survives Mancari rational basis
508. KG Urban Enters., 839 F. Supp. 2d. at 394.
509. See id. at 392.
510. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
511. See id. at 403-04 (citing Spruhan, supra note 77, at 12; Kirsty Gover, Geneology as
Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in Membership
Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 243 (2009); Rolnick, supra note 9, at
1001).
512. See Gover, supra note 511, at 248-54; Rolnick, supra note 9, at 1008-10; Spruhan, supra
note 77, at 47-49.

513. See supra Parts II.B and III; see also Goldberg, supra note 41, at 958-64; Carole Goldberg,
Descent Into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1673 (2002).
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review. 5 14 But, if the court could have addressed the issue as one of first
impression:
[I]t would treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasiracial classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny
depending on the authority making it and the interests at stake.
Federal laws relating to native land, tribal status or Indian
culture would require minimal review because such laws fall
squarely within the historical and constitutional authority of
Congress to regulate core Indian affairs. Laws granting
gratuitous preference divorced from those interests, such as . . . a

law granting tribes a quasi-monopoly on casino gaming, would
be subject to more searching scrutiny.1
The district court's proposed multi-tiered scrutiny reveals precisely
why the Supreme Court should resist the invitation to grapple with the
"inherent tension" between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause.si6 If it does so, it will be likely to misconceive the
tension in precisely the way the Massachusetts court did. The tension is
not bi-polar: "Indian Commerce Clause versus Equal Protection." The
tension is multi-directional and dynamic. The historical racialization of
tribes and the lingering effects of that eliminationist project cannot be
redressed by empowering courts, for the first time, to scrutinize
economic legislation that allows tribes to carry out inherent
governmental powers. To the contrary, embedded in the court's
proposed approach is a re-racialization that boxes tribes into traditional
cultural projects while pre-judging as "gratuitous" contemporary
economic benefits.5 17 If the Supreme Court opts to grapple with the
tensions inherent in federal Indian law, it should take in the full scope of
how the federal government's relationship with tribes has racialized the
political relationship and politicized "race" in ways that defy ahistorical
and colorblind scrutiny. Otherwise, tugging on just one strand might
well unravel all that is moving in the right direction in terms of
perpetuating tribal survival, and leave intact the most crushing forms of
eliminationist law and policy.
B.

Challenges by Nonmember Indians to Duro-fix Legislation
Tribal governments exercise inherent criminal authority over tribal

514. See KG Urban Enters., 839 F. Supp. 2d. at 405.
515. Id. at 404.
516. Id.
517. See id.
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members and also over members of other Indian tribes. 1 s The history of
how tribes became "federally recognized tribes," and the more particular
histories of CRIT and the Great Dakota Nation recounted in Parts II.B
and III above, echo the broader historical justification for recognizing
tribal powers over their own and other members, in that the distinction
between a tribe's members and those of another tribe was, and remains,
fluid and historically contingent. 5 19 Nonetheless, as discussed above, in
Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court held that tribes did not have inherent
authority to prosecute nonmember Indians. 5 20 Tribal leaders and
academics immediately and roundly criticized Duro.52 1 Not only did
Duro misconceive history, the decision created a jurisdictional vacuum
for criminal law enforcement in Indian country. States do not have
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed by
Indians, and the federal government lacks the authority to prosecute
misdemeanor crimes committed by Indian perpetrators against Indian
victims.522 The only government with the authority to prosecute
nonmember Indians for certain categories of crimes against other Indians
was and remains the tribal government. 523 As a result, Congress
overturned the result in Duro just a year after the case was decided.5 24
The Supreme Court upheld the Duro-fix legislation in United States v.
Lara52 5 on the grounds that Congress's power in Indian affairs includes
the ability to affirm the inherent authority of tribes to subject
nonmember Indians to criminal prosecution. 526 Lara was brought as a
double jeopardy case. 5 27 The defendant, Billy Jo Lara, had already been
convicted in tribal court. 528 He argued that Congress lacked the power to
518. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
519. See supra Parts II.B and III; see also Krakoff, supra note 350, at 1280-82 (describing
incorporation of Northern Cheyenne tribal members into the Pine Ridge/Oglala Lakota Tribe).
520. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990), discussed supra at note 256.
521. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story ofNative Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV.
5 (2004) (describing strong negative response from tribal leaders and academics).
522. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 310-21 (describing criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country).
523. Public Law 280 jurisdictions where states have assumed criminal authority over Indian
Country are the only exception to this. The weakness of PL 280 law enforcement further highlights
the impracticality of turning to states to address Indian country crime. See Carole GoldbergAmbrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem ofLawlessness in CaliforniaIndian Country, 44 UCLA
L. REv. 1405 (1997).
524. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2006).
525. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
526. See id. at 200.
527. Id. at 196-97.

528. Id.
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restore tribal inherent sovereignty and that his tribal prosecution,
therefore, was federal in nature and barred a second prosecution by the
same sovereign-the federal government.5 29 Lara also challenged his
federal prosecution on equal protection and due process grounds, but the
Court set those issues aside as relevant only to the tribal prosecution.530
The Court indicated that there might well be equal protection and due
process concerns, but they would have to be raised in a challenge to the
tribal court's criminal jurisdiction.
Russell Means brought that challenge. In Means v. Navajo Nation,532
Means, a member of the Oglala Lakota Nation, had been charged in the
Navajo Nation tribal court for various crimes, including assault.5 3 3 He
disputed the Navajo Nation's criminal power, arguing that subjecting
him to the tribal court's jurisdiction was no different than subjecting a
non-Indian because Means could never become a member of the Navajo
Nation. The Duro-fix subjected only other Indians, and not non-Indians,
to tribal court jurisdiction, a distinction that Means argued violated the
equal protection component of the Due Process clause. The Ninth
Circuit, though noting that Means' argument had "real force,"534 upheld
the Duro-fix and Means' tribal court prosecution under Mancari. The
court first noted that the Duro-fix did not subject all "ethnic Indians" to
criminal prosecution, but only those Indians who met the Major Crimes
Act definition that requires Indian ancestry and political affiliation.
Therefore, the classification, like the one in Mancari itself, "is political
rather than racial, and the only Indians subjected to tribal court
jurisdiction are enrolled or de facto members of tribes, not all ethnic
Indians." 3 Furthermore, Means' enrollment in another tribe satisfied
the statute's requirements: "The statute subjects Means to Navajo
criminal jurisdiction not because of his race but because of his political
status as an enrolled member of a different Indian tribe."5 37
Despite Means' relatively straightforward application of Mancari,the
court expressed concern about the turbulent backdrop of politics and
race. The "force" it found in Means' claims consisted of three factors,
529.
530.
531.
532.

See id. at 208-09.
See id.
See id.
432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005).

533. Id.
534. Id. at 932.
535. See id. at 930.
536. Id. at 933 (emphasis in original).
537. Id. at 934.
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the first two of which are relevant here.s38 First, Means, although not
Navajo, could be prosecuted by the Navajo Nation, which situated him
differently from "whites, blacks, Asians, or any other non-Navajos who
are accused of crimes on the reservation."53 9 The court's concern was
that the Duro-fix, therefore, exposed a certain category of nonmembers
to tribal prosecution, but not others. The appeal of Means' argument is
that he was being "checked off' by race in ways that "whites, blacks,
Asians" were not. A response (that the court did not provide) is that
Means is simply incorrect. White, black, and Asian people who are also
members offederally recognized tribes (in other words, people of mixed
ancestry who nonetheless meet their tribes' membership requirements)
would also be subject to tribal prosecution. This can only be disputed on
the basis that some "races" are not susceptible to mixed ancestry. While
there was a time that such an assertion, in the context of whiteness, was
unproblematic,540 presumably it would be a reactionary one to make
today. The court, therefore, missed an opportunity to explain the
political (and legal) nature of all racial categories inherent in Means'
assumption that some "races" (whites, blacks, Asians) cannot also be
Indian. The Means court's second concern was that Means could never
become Navajo. 5 41 The history of tribal recognition, including the
overriding forces limiting tribal territory and membership, should inform
current judgments about tribal enrollment criteria. Against the backdrop
of relentless historical pressure to define "tribes" and "tribal
membership" in ways convenient for the settler society's goals of
clearing the land, the only appropriate judicial role is to refrain from
holding that very history against tribes today.
To date, courts are following Mancari,though some appear to bristle
at what they perceive to be its blind spots. The foregoing histories of
tribal recognition and tribal membership indicate that the failure of
vision is much larger than an unsatisfying doctrinal distinction between
the "political" and the "racial." It is a failure to grapple with the ways
that tribes and their members were racialized in order to divest them of
538. The court's third concern was that the Navajo Nation, like all tribes, is not subject to the Bill
of Rights. See id. at 932. Tribal courts are, however, subject to the Indian Civil Rights Act, which
includes most of the same protections. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 13011303 (2006). The most significant exception is the right to free counsel for indigent defendants. The
Navajo Nation, however, provides representation to indigent defendants through a public defender
service and requires pro bono representation. See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 606(A)
(2010).
539. Means, 432 F.2d at 932.
540. See Harris,supranote 86, at 1737.
541. Means, 432 F.2d at 932.
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land and, ultimately, ensure their orderly disappearance. There is no
distinction between the political and the racial in that larger story, yet the
story reinforces the importance of judicial restraint when it comes to
unpacking those categories today.
CONCLUSION
Race and politics are deeply entangled by and throughout our history.
The construction of racial categories has served distinct political ends for
all subordinated groups. In the case of indigenous peoples, that end was
their eventual erasure from the continent. The resulting eliminationist
policies shaped early conceptions of tribes and have had sticky effects
on all aspects of federal Indian law, including the federal government's
trust relationship with tribes as well as understandings of tribal political
status, tribal membership, and tribal inherent powers. For the past
several decades, the federal government's policies with respect to tribes
have generally supported tribal self-governance and self-determination.
Laws affecting Indian tribes and people no longer overtly embrace the
racial logic of elimination. Yet the current laws operate in a context
inevitably soaked in the racialized and eliminationist policies of the past.
For contemporary federal policies to reach fruition, tribes and their allies
must continue to work their way out of that racial and political thicket.
Untangling the ways in which American Indian tribes have been
constructed by the racial and eliminationist logic of our past is no mean
feat. The first crucial step, however, is to understand the history in all of
its complexity. The legal histories of the Colorado River Indian Tribes
and the tribes of the Great Dakota Nation provide two different windows
into that larger history. The CRIT story is one of constructing a single
tribe out of many distinct peoples. The "race" of the single tribe was
subordinate to the larger distinction between Indians and whites. The
overriding need to clear the West for non-Indian settlement resulted in a
multi-ethnic polity that had no precedence in the governing or social
structures of the Mohave, Chemehuevi, Navajo, and Hopi people. The
Dakota story, on the other hand, is one of scattering and concentrating
peoples of various and overlapping ethnic, social, and political structures
onto separate reservations. The result today is a much greater degree of
affiliation between and among the Sioux Tribes than is generally
appreciated.
Both of these histories are set in the larger context of the federal
government's imposition of static definitions of "tribe" and
"membership." Whatever membership might have meant for tribes in
pre-contact times, today it is shaped by the complicated process of
having traveled the route from independent people to "domestic
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dependent nation." Part of that process entailed a shift from fluid and
territorially-based absorptions of new people to bureaucratized
accountings that incorporated blood quantum and descent.5 42 That shift
was imposed on tribes by the federal government's overriding
objectives, during different policy periods, of quantifying and ultimately
shrinking the number of indigenous people who inconveniently occupied
and had legitimate claims to land and resources.
In terms of current legal doctrine, the Mancari rule-that federal
courts should not subject classifications based on tribal political status to
heightened scrutiny when those classifications "can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians" 5 4 3-is
probably the best courts can do. The categories "federally recognized
tribe" and "tribal member" are political, even while they also include the
racialized history of the federal government's treatment of Native
peoples. Given that courts are unlikely to engage in the deep, contextual
analysis necessary to untangle the racial from the political in ways that
will reverse eliminationist policies, it is better to stick with Mancari's
good-enough formulation. If courts move in the direction of scrutinizing
tribes' distinctive status in today's color-blind climate, they are more
likely to entrench historical discrimination against indigenous peoples
than to reverse it. Thus, while courts should continue to subject racial
discrimination against Indian people to heightened scrutiny, they should
not reassess Mancari's approach toward federal classifications that
further the unique government-to-government relationship between
tribes and the federal government.
Despite the dominance of eliminationist policies toward indigenous
peoples, there has always been a tensile counter-thread. As a nation, we
pulled up short of severing completely the ties that American Indian
tribes had to their pre-contact status as independent sovereigns. And
American Indian tribes have seized each opportunity to continue as
distinct peoples, exercising tribal self-governance in the shadow of the
law when necessary, as well as through the convoluted forms made
available through law. The legal forms of the federally recognized tribe
and tribal member, and the legal doctrines assigning meaning to those
forms, are a product of that complicated history of subordination and
survival. The ultimate goals of Indian law today should be to overthrow
the remnants of elimination in favor of indigenous survival.

542. See supra Part I.B.
543. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).

